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Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and 
Brett Kavanaugh Clash Over Federal 
Regulation and Criminal Justice  
Daniel Harris 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett 
Kavanaugh are turning out to be quite different from each other. 
During the Court’s October 2018 term (ending in June 2019), in 
cases with at least one dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh and 
Justice Neil Gorsuch were on opposite sides 49% of the time. In 
the October 2019 term, the two Trump-appointed Justices again 
disagreed in significant cases. The thesis of this Article is that 
there are themes to the differences between Justice Kavanaugh 
and Justice Gorsuch that can be discerned from their votes and 
opinions.  
The first theme relates to jurisprudential style. Justice 
Gorsuch follows the tenets of legal formalism, originalism, and 
textualism. He is apt to find definite, fixed rules established in the 
past that he follows to their logical conclusions, regardless of 
practical consequences or policy considerations. By contrast, 
Justice Kavanaugh tends to be pragmatic and flexible. Less 
interested in original intent or logical rigor and more deferential 
to precedent and convention, he tends to balance competing 
interests and strives for reasonable solutions that make common 
sense in the here and now. 
The second area of difference lies in the Justices’ attitudes 
toward the federal government. Justice Kavanaugh has a positive 
view of the federal government and federal power. He resolves 
ambiguities in favor of giving federal officials reasonable 
discretion to address contemporary problems and meet the needs 
of society. In disputes between the federal government and 
individuals, he is inclined to vote for the government. By contrast, 
Justice Gorsuch has a skeptical view of the federal government. 
He prefers to limit the discretion of federal officials through 
formal rules that establish clear individual rights. In disputes 
between individuals and the federal government, Justice Gorsuch 
is more apt to side with the individual. 
 
  Adjunct Professor of Agency Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 1:41 PM 
340 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:2 
The split between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch 
has enormous potential ramifications because it moderates their 
collective influence on the Court. In addition, the jurisprudential 
conflict between the new appointees, as expressed in their 
opinions, is a fascinating study in how different two Justices 
appointed by the same President can be. 
INTRODUCTION 
Confounding expectations,1 it turns out President Trump’s 
first two appointees to the Supreme Court are quite different 
from each other.2 In their first term together, in cases with at 
least one dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Justice Neil 
Gorsuch were on opposite sides 49% of the time,3 an unusually 
high rate of disagreement for a pair of new Justices appointed by 
the same President.4 In their second term together, the two 
Trump-appointed Justices agreed more often, but they still 
parted company several times,5 often in significant cases. For 
example, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh wrote opinions 
on opposite sides of the case holding that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.6 
The splits between the two Justices did not track the 
familiar right-to-left political spectrum. Both Justices were 
willing to side with the Court’s Democratic appointees. For 
example, in the October 2018 term, Justice Kavanaugh voted 
with Obama appointee Justice Elena Kagan 70% of the time and 
51% of the time in divided cases (just as often as he agreed with 
Justice Gorsuch).7 For his part, in five to four cases in the 
October 2018 term, Justice Gorsuch voted with Justice Ginsburg 
35% of the time and with Justice Sotomayor 35% of the time.8 
 
 1 See Jeremy Kidd, New Metrics and Politics of Judicial Selection, 70 ALA. L. REV. 
785 (2019) (showing quantitative analysis that Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh 
had very similar conservative predictive scores). 
 2 See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Supreme Court Term Marked by Shifting Alliances 
and Surprise Votes, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/us/supreme-
court-decisions.html [http://perma.cc/7NR7-C9VS] (“[T]he two newest justices are a study in 
contrasts.”). 
 3 See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
28, 2019, 5:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-
2018/ [http://perma.cc/P4EH-6UMN]. 
 4 See Robert Barnes, Trump’s Justices Aren’t Always on Same Page, WASH. POST, 
June 30, 2019, at A1 (“Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have disagreed more often than any pair 
of new justices chosen by the same president in decades.”). 
 5 See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019, SCOTUSBLOG (July 
10, 2020, 7:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Justice-
agreement-7.10.20.pdf [http://perma.cc/7A57-GL8Y]. 
 6 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 7 See Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, supra note 3. 
 8 See id. 
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The thesis of this Article is that there is a pattern to the 
disagreements between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch 
that can be discerned from their opinions and is consistent with 
their differing personal backgrounds. As discussed in detail 
below, the two Justices have very different attitudes toward the 
federal government and different jurisprudential philosophies.9 
Discussed below is a quick preview. 
Justice Kavanaugh has lived in the Washington, D.C., area 
almost all of his life, the exceptions being seven years at Yale for 
college and law school and a one-year judicial clerkship on the 
West Coast. He has spent his career in federal service.10 After 
clerking for Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, he became 
a federal prosecutor in the Whitewater investigation.11 He later 
served in the George W. Bush White House where he met his 
wife, who was then a secretary for the President.12 
Justice Kavanaugh has a positive, insider attitude toward 
the federal government. He sees it as a force for good. He 
approaches problems from the perspective of the establishment 
in his hometown. To facilitate the beneficial use of federal power, 
Justice Kavanaugh takes a flexible, pragmatic, public policy 
approach to the judicial role.13 He interprets laws in a modern, 
common-sense way. While cautious about change and sensitive to 
conservative values, Justice Kavanaugh believes judges should, 
within reasonable and limited bounds, modernize the law when 
necessary to further underlying policy goals. Justice Kavanaugh 
tends to resolve ambiguities in favor of giving federal officials 
reasonable discretion.14 He sympathizes with those who exercise 
federal authority or need the protection of federal power. He has 
far less sympathy for those subject to federal power.15 
 
 9 For a short essay introducing this idea, see Daniel Harris, New Swing Votes on 
U.S. Supreme Court, 114 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 258 (2020). The approach follows other 
scholarship. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, Second Dimension Supreme 
Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2016) (dividing the Supreme Court Justices into 
pragmatic and legalistic groups); C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions Opinion Among Justices 
U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–41, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 890 (1941) (finding that 
Supreme Court Justices “are influenced by biases and philosophies of government, . . . 
which to a large degree predetermine the position they will take on a given question. 
Private attitudes, in other words, become public law.”). 
 10 See MOLLIE HEMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 9, 19 (2019). 
 11 See Matthew Nussbaum, Brett Kavanaugh: Who is He? Bio, Facts, Background and 
Political Views, POLITICO (July 9, 2018, 2:11 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/brett-
kavanaugh-who-is-he-bio-facts-background-and-political-views-703346 [http://perma.cc/3TDJ-
BDSK]. 
 12 See id. at 18–19. 
 13 See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).  
 14 See, e.g., County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1478 (2020) 
(Kavanuagh, J., concurring).  
 15 See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019).  
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Justice Gorsuch is cut from a different cloth. A native of 
Colorado, his experience with the nation’s capital in his early 
teens was difficult.16 In 1981, his mother (Anne Gorsuch), after a 
successful career in Colorado state government,17 became 
President Reagan’s first Director of the Environmental Protection 
Agency.18 In that position, she clashed with the D.C. 
establishment over her deregulatory efforts.19 Accused of 
dismantling her agency and cited for contempt of Congress, Anne 
Gorsuch was eventually forced from office.20 At his Senate 
confirmation hearing in 2017, Justice Gorsuch said his mother 
taught him “that headlines are fleeting—courage lasts.”21 The 
subtext was that Justice Gorsuch believes in following principles 
even if they lead to unpopular conclusions. 
For most of his pre-judicial legal career, Justice Gorsuch 
worked in the private sector.22 After a Supreme Court clerkship 
for Justice Byron White and Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice 
Gorsuch spent about a decade (including eight years as a 
partner) as a litigator at Kellog Huber, an elite D.C. law firm 
that represented private parties, often in opposition to the 
federal government.23 When George W. Bush was President, 
Justice Gorsuch spent a year in the Justice Department, working 
mainly on national security matters,24 before his appointment to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, based in Denver, 
Colorado, where he served for about a decade prior to joining the 
Supreme Court.25 It is also worth noting that Justice Gorsuch 
has a doctorate in moral philosophy from Oxford26 and met his 
wife when he was a student there.27 
 
 16 See Heather Elliott, Gorsuch v. The Administrative State, 70 ALA. L. REV. 703, 711 (2019).  
 17 See NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 317 (2019). 
 18 See Biography of Anne M. Gorsuch (Burford), EPA (May 20, 1981), 
http://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/biography-anne-m-gorsuch-burford.html 
[http://perma.cc/3MYK-6X8B]. 
 19 See Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Neil Gorsuch’s Mother Once Ran EPA. It Didn’t go 
Well, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017, 4:33 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuchs-mother-once-ran-the-epa-it-was-a-disaster/ 
[http://perma.cc/XN4N-C92F]. 
 20 See Elliott, supra note 16. 
 21 GORSUCH, supra note 17, at 317. 
 22 See Elliott, supra note 16. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Matt Ford, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch for the U.S. Supreme Court, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/gorsuch-trump-
supreme-court/515232/ [http://perma.cc/M8NF-DQTY]. 
 26 See Christopher R. Green, Justice Gorsuch and Moral Reality, 70 ALA. L. REV. 
635, 636 (2019). 
 27 Joey Bunch, Louise Gorsuch Goes Down in History, Sharing Marmalade Recipe in Supreme 
Court Book, COLO. POLITICS (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/louise-gorsuch-
goes-down-in-history-sharing-marmalade-recipe-in-supreme-court-book/article_c888b00d-d724-
5913-8dea-d21bff2da6c2.html [http://perma.cc/M8ZC-NWBQ]. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 1:41 PM 
2021] Supreme Court Justices Clash 343 
Justice Gorsuch has a wary, outsider attitude toward the 
federal government.28 He fears its unauthorized encroachment on 
democratic self-governance and the traditional common law.29 He 
opposes judges or federal agencies updating the law to conform to 
modern policy or popular sentiment.30 Instead, Justice Gorsuch 
believes judges must follow the law as it is, not as they want it to 
be.31 In his mind, this means reasoning from (his vision of) the 
basic precepts of the American Republic, the common law, and 
Western Civilization—such as respect for the individual and the 
rule of law, as supplemented by duly enacted legal texts 
construed in accordance with the interpretative tools that judges 
have used for centuries.32 While this philosophy usually leads to 
narrowing constructions of federal power, Justice Gorsuch will 
follow his (often literalist) understanding of the written law to its 
logical conclusion even if that means an expansion of federal 
authority.33 
To demonstrate this thesis about the differences between the 
two Justices, this Article proceeds in six parts plus a conclusion. 
Part I considers a case in which Justice Kavanaugh and Justice 
Gorsuch wrote opposing opinions that illustrate their differing 
attitudes toward the federal government and conflicting 
jurisprudential approaches. Part II discusses four cases from the 
October 2018 term in which Justice Kavanaugh voted with 
Justice Ginsburg in support of federal regulation and Justice 
Gorsuch was on the other side. Part III discusses four cases from 
the October 2018 term in which Justice Gorsuch voted with 
Justice Ginsburg in support of parties opposed to the federal 
government and Justice Kavanaugh was on the other side. Part 
IV looks at cases from the October 2018 term in which Justice 
Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh were in agreement. Part V looks 
at six cases from the Supreme Court’s October 2019 term in 
which Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch were on opposite 
sides and one or both wrote opinions. Part VI makes 
generalizations comparing the pragmatic insider jurisprudence of 
Justice Kavanaugh with the formalist outsider approach of 
Justice Gorsuch. Part VII briefly concludes by considering what 
the differences between the two Justices might mean for the 
future of United States law. 
 
 28 Daniel Harris, The New Swing Votes on the U.S. Supreme Court, 114 NW. L. REV. 
ONLINE 258, 260 (2020). 
 29 Id. 
 30 GORSUCH, supra note 17, at 10. 
 31 Id.  
 32 See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2442 (2019) (Gorsuch J., concurring). 
 33 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).  
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I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFLICT 
The jurisprudential conflict between Justice Gorsuch and 
Justice Kavanaugh is best illustrated by United States v. Davis, a 
five-to-four decision in which the majority coalition consisted of 
the Court’s four Democratic appointees plus Justice Gorsuch.34 In 
Davis, the defendants “Maurice Davis and Andrew Glover 
committed a string of gas station robberies in Texas.”35 They 
were caught, prosecuted in federal court, and convicted of 
violations of the federal Hobbs Act and conspiracy to violate the 
Hobbs Act.36 Because they used a shotgun to commit their 
crimes, they were also convicted of carrying or using a firearm to 
violate the Hobbs Act and using or carrying a firearm in 
connection with their conspiracy.37 The question before the 
Supreme Court involved the validity of that last conviction.38 
The governing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), mandated 
“heightened criminal penalties” for using or carrying a firearm in 
connection with a federal “crime of violence.”39 The term “crime of 
violence” had alternative definitions set forth in § 924(c)(3).40 
According to § 924(c)(3)(A), a crime of violence was a felony that 
had “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” 
as one of its elements.41 Alternatively, § 924(c)(3)(B) defined a 
“crime of violence” as a felony “that by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”42 
The defendants’ convictions for carrying or using a firearm in 
connection with their Hobbs Act violations were valid under  
§ 924(c)(3)(A) because the use or threatened use of force was an 
element of the Hobbs Act crime.43 But § 924(c)(3)(A) did not work for 
the defendants’ convictions for carrying or using a firearm in 
connection with the conspiracy charge because the use or threatened 
use of force was not an element of conspiracy.44 To justify those 
convictions, the government needed to use § 924(c)(3)(B).45 
 
 34 United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). 
 35 Id. at 2324. 
 36 Id. at 2324–25. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 2324. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 2324. 
 43 Id. at 2523, 2336. 
 44 Id. at 2325. 
 45 Id. at 2327. 
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That was a problem. Courts and the government construed  
§ 924(c)(3)(B) to require what was called the “categorical 
approach”—an inquiry into the potential for harm inherent in the 
category of offense that the defendant committed (e.g., whether wire 
fraud is the type of crime that has a substantial risk of harm).46 In 
2018, the Supreme Court held that a virtually identical statutory 
definition of “crime of violence” also mandated that same categorical 
approach and it was unconstitutionally vague because it required 
courts “to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in the 
ordinary case, and to judge whether that abstraction presents some 
not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-large degree of risk.”47  
To get rid of the vagueness problem and thereby save the 
convictions and the statute, the government asked the Supreme 
Court to reinterpret § 924(c)(3)(B) so that its definition of a crime 
of violence would depend on what defendants actually did and 
not on the hypothetical potential for harm associated with their 
category of crime.48 The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, 
ruled against the government.49 The five Justices in the majority 
were the Court’s four Democratic appointees plus Justice 
Gorsuch, who wrote the majority opinion.50 
Justice Gorsuch began his opinion by making it clear that he 
did not consider the statute a first draft that the Court could 
rework, stating: “In our constitutional order, a vague law is no 
law at all. Only the people’s elected representatives in Congress 
have the power to write new federal criminal laws.”51 Justice 
Gorsuch went on to explain that: “When Congress passes a vague 
law, the role of courts under our Constitution is not to fashion a 
new, clearer law to take its place, but to treat the law as a nullity 
and invite Congress to try again.”52 
Taking his task as statutory interpretation, not revision, 
Justice Gorsuch said § 924(c)(3)(B) meant what it appeared to 
say.53 For purposes of the section, a crime of violence was to be 
determined using the categorical approach, which involved 
assessing the potential for harm associated with the abstract 
category of the defendant’s offense.54 Because this inquiry 
provided “no reliable way to determine which offenses qualify as 
 
 46 See id. at 2326. 
 47 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211, 1216 (2018) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 48 See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2327. 
 49 Id. at 2336. 
 50 Id. at 2323. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 2323–24. 
 54 Id. at 2324. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 1:41 PM 
346 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:2 
crimes of violence,” the language was “unconstitutionally 
vague.”55 
Justice Gorsuch explained that the government’s alternative 
reading of the statute could not “be squared with the statute’s 
text, context, and history.”56 Were the Supreme Court to adopt 
the government’s revised version of the statute, Justice Gorsuch 
said, the Supreme Court Justices would be “stepping outside 
[their] role as judges and writing a new law rather than applying 
the one Congress adopted.”57 
Justice Gorsuch emphasized that the defendants would still 
receive substantial prison time because they “did many things 
that Congress had declared to be crimes” and would “face 
substantial prison sentences for those offenses.”58 
Justice Gorsuch also noted that the government’s new 
reading of Section 924(c)(3)(B) would criminalize some conduct 
that was not made criminal by the law as it was actually written 
(such as a defendant’s use of a firearm in connection with an 
offense that does not normally involve the use of force).59 
Expanding the statute through interpretation “would risk 
offending the very same due process and separation-of-powers 
principles on which the vagueness doctrine itself rests.”60 
Therefore, despite the general reluctance of courts to declare Acts 
of Congress unconstitutional, “a court may not, in order to save 
Congress the trouble of having to write a new law, construe a 
criminal statute to penalize conduct it does not clearly 
proscribe.”61 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote the dissent, joined in whole by 
Justices Thomas and Alito and in part by Chief Justice Roberts.62 
The dissenting opinion, like the majority opinion, began with a 
discussion of important considerations: “Crime and firearms form a 
dangerous mix. From the 1960s through the 1980s, violent gun 
crime was rampant in America.”63 Emphasizing the practical needs 
of modern American society,64 Justice Kavanaugh noted that “The 
wave of violence destroyed lives and devastated communities, 
particularly in America’s cities. Between 1963 and 1968, annual 
murders with firearms rose by a staggering 87 percent, and annual 
 
 55 Id. at 2323–24. 
 56 Id. at 2324. 
 57 Id. (alteration in original). 
 58 Id. at 2333. 
 59 Id. at 2332. 
 60 Id. at 2332–33. 
 61 Id. at 2333. 
 62 Id. at 2336. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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aggravated assaults with firearms increased by more than 230 
percent.”65  
Continuing in a pragmatic vein, Justice Kavanaugh went on 
to describe how “[f]aced with an onslaught of violent gun crime 
and its debilitating effects, the American people demanded 
action.”66 Justice Kavanaugh explained that gun control laws, 
such as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), were passed in response.67 “Over the 
last 33 years, tens of thousands of § 924(c) cases have been 
prosecuted in the federal courts. Meanwhile, violent crime with 
firearms has decreased significantly.”68 
Justice Kavanaugh then attacked as surprising and 
extraordinary the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a key 
provision of § 924(c)—”a federal law that has been applied so 
often for so long with so little problem.”69 Justice Kavanaugh 
warned that “[t]he Court’s decision . . . will make it harder to 
prosecute violent gun crimes in the future.”70 Further, he stated 
“[t]he Court’s decision also will likely mean that thousands of 
inmates who committed violent gun crimes will be released far 
earlier than Congress specified when enacting § 924(c). The 
inmates who will be released . . . are offenders who committed 
violent crimes with firearms, often brutally violent crimes.”71 
Justice Gorsuch responded to Justice Kavanaugh’s first 
argument by saying that there was nothing “surprising” or 
“extraordinary” about striking down a statute when even the 
government conceded the law would be unconstitutional if it 
continued to mean what it had meant through thousands of 
prosecutions.72 On the contrary, Justice Gorsuch said, it would be 
surprising and extraordinary if the Supreme Court could save 
the statute by suddenly giving it “a new meaning different from 
the one it has borne for the last three decades.”73 
Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent argued that the most sensible 
approach for a statute such as § 924(c)(3)(B) was to focus on what 
the defendant had actually done and not to employ the 
categorical approach of looking at the potential for harm 
associated with the abstract crime.74 Justice Kavanaugh quoted a 
lower court opinion: “If you were to ask John Q. Public whether a 
 
 65 Id. at 2336 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 2337. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at 2333 (majority opinion).  
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 2343 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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particular crime posed a substantial risk of violence, surely he 
would respond, ‘Well, tell me how it went down—what 
happened?’”75 The majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch responded 
that the language of the statute before the Supreme Court was 
not “the language posited in the dissent’s push poll. Section 
924(c)(3)(B) doesn’t ask about the risk that ‘a particular crime 
posed’ but about the risk that an ‘offense . . . by its nature, 
involves.’”76 
The dissent by Justice Kavanaugh said that it did not matter that 
the government had for many years taken the position that  
§ 924(c)(3)(B) mandated the (now unconstitutional) categorical 
approach, noting that the government’s position came “after the courts 
settled on a categorical approach—at a time when it did not matter for 
constitutional vagueness purposes . . . .”77 In response, Justice Gorsuch 
asked: “Isn’t it at least a little revealing that, when the government had 
no motive to concoct an alternative reading, even it thought the best 
reading of § 924(c)(3)(B) demanded categorical analysis?”78 
The dissent by Justice Kavanaugh noted that the word 
“offense” in § 924(c)(3) could be read to refer to what the 
defendant had actually done,79 and that “an ambiguous statute 
must be interpreted, whenever possible, to avoid 
unconstitutionality.”80 Therefore, Justice Kavanaugh said, “it is 
fairly possible to interpret § 924(c)(3)(B) to focus on the 
defendant’s actual conduct” and that reading would make the 
statute constitutional.81  
In response, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the dissent’s 
new reading of the law would criminalize conduct that was not 
criminal under the categorical approach—the interpretation of 
the law that fit best with the statute’s language and history.82 
Justice Gorsuch chided the dissent for “not even try[ing] to 
explain how using the canon to criminalize conduct that isn’t 
criminal under the fairest reading of a statute might be 
reconciled with traditional principles of fair notice and 
separation of powers.”83 Justice Gorsuch noted that “the dissent 
seem[ed] willing to consign thousands of defendants to prison for 
years . . . because it [was] merely possible Congress might have 
 
 75 Id. (quoting Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2018)). 
 76 Id. at 2334 (majority opinion). 
 77 Id. at 2355 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 78 Id. at 2334 (majority opinion). 
 79 Id. at 2347–48 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 80 Id. at 2350. 
 81 Id. at 2351. 
 82 Id. at 2335 (majority opinion). 
 83 Id. 
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[ordained those penalties].”84 Justice Gorsuch concluded: “In our 
republic, a speculative possibility that a man’s conduct violated 
the law should never be enough to justify taking his liberty.”85 
The last section of the dissent returned to the theme that 
“[t]he Court’s decision means that people who in the future 
commit violent crimes with firearms may be able to escape 
conviction under § 924(c).”86 After giving an example of a horrible 
crime that might go unpunished, Justice Kavanaugh argued that 
“when the consequences [of a statutory interpretation] are this 
bad,” the Court should “double-check” its legal analysis.87 That 
double-checking, Justice Kavanaugh went on, would show that 
the statute did not really compel the Court’s decision in Davis.88 
Justice Kavanaugh concluded: “I am not persuaded that the 
Court can blame this decision on Congress. The Court has a way 
out, if it wants a way out.”89 
The majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch addressed the 
dissent’s public policy arguments by asking: “[W]hat’s the point 
of all this talk of ‘bad’ consequences if not to suggest that judges 
should be tempted into reading the law to satisfy their policy 
goals?”90 Justice Gorsuch went on to note the various ways 
Congress could fix the problem and then concluded: “[T]hese are 
options that belong to Congress to consider; no matter how 
tempting, this Court is not in the business of writing new 
statutes to right every social wrong it may perceive.”91 
The Davis decision illustrates the philosophical differences 
between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh. Justice 
Gorsuch construed the statute based on its text, history, and 
prior construction. Justice Kavanaugh focused on the general 
purpose of the statute, common sense, and the practical 
consequences of alternative interpretations. Justice Gorsuch’s 
focus was on the rights of the individual; he resolved doubts 
about the meaning of the law against the government and in 
favor of liberty. Justice Kavanaugh’s concern was with the 
welfare of society; he resolved ambiguities in favor of the 
government and against wrongdoers. 
Justice Gorsuch treated the statute’s meaning as objective 
and fixed; something individuals could ascertain and rely on, not 
 
 84 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 2353 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 2355. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 2335 (majority opinion). 
 91 Id. at 2336. 
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something government officials could manipulate based on their 
notions of the best interests of society. Justice Kavanaugh saw 
the law’s meaning as malleable; something the government and 
the Court could and should alter in order to serve the public 
interest. 
II. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH WITH JUSTICE GINSBURG AGAINST 
JUSTICE GORSUCH 
In cases involving assertions of federal power, Justice 
Kavanaugh often sided with the Court’s liberal Justices and against 
Justice Gorsuch. This section provides four examples. Two of the 
cases discussed below involved federal regulation of private 
business, and two involved constitutional challenges to state 
actions. In all four cases, Justice Kavanaugh took the side of the 
parties invoking federal power while Justice Gorsuch sided with 
parties resisting federal power. Justice Kavanaugh justified his 
rulings with pragmatic and progressive arguments consistent with 
the modern norms of Washington, D.C. Justice Gorsuch made a 
variety of counterarguments in support of local self-governance and 
the traditional common law. 
A. Apple Inc. v. Pepper92 
Apple Inc., an antitrust case, arose out of Apple’s practice of 
requiring its customers to purchase applications (“app”) for Apple 
devices through the Apple App Store.93 Several customers sued 
Apple for allegedly using its monopoly power to charge higher 
prices than Apple customers would otherwise have paid.94 The 
gist of Apple’s defense was that it did not set the allegedly 
unlawful prices.95 Although Apple imposed a uniform 30% 
commission on the developers, Apple argued that it should not be 
blamed for the prices because the developer of each app 
ultimately set the price for that app.96  
The company invoked a 1977 Supreme Court precedent, 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,97 which held that customers who did 
not purchase directly from the alleged antitrust violator did not 
have standing to sue that party for damages under the federal 
antitrust laws. Apple argued that the general principle of Illinois 
Brick should apply because, similar to the facts in that case, the 
 
 92 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 93 Id. at 1518–19. 
 94 See id. at 1518. 
 95 See id. at 1519. 
 96 See id. at 1519, 1521–22. 
 97 See id. at 1519; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728–29 (1977). 
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consumer plaintiffs were suing a party that did not set the prices 
that caused the alleged antitrust injury.98  
The district court agreed with Apple and dismissed the 
case.99 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
consumers had standing to sue under Illinois Brick because they 
purchased their apps directly from Apple.100 The question before 
the Supreme Court was whether to adopt a broad construction of 
the Sherman Act and a narrow construction of the Illinois Brick 
exception (as the plaintiffs wanted) or, conversely, a narrow 
construction of the Sherman Act and a broad construction of the 
Illinois Brick exception, as Apple urged.101 
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court sided with the 
consumer plaintiffs.102 The majority consisted of the Court’s four 
liberal Justices plus Justice Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority 
opinion.103 The opinion twice emphasized that the Sherman Act 
should be construed broadly to achieve its purpose of protecting 
consumers from monopolists.104 Early on, the opinion noted: “A 
claim that a monopolistic retailer (here, Apple) has used its 
monopoly to overcharge consumers is a classic antitrust claim.”105 
The opinion went on to say that it would be inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme to immunize monopolistic retailers from 
antitrust litigation in the scenario where the retailers have their 
suppliers set the base prices.106 “We refuse to rubber-stamp such 
a blatant evasion of statutory text and judicial precedent.”107 
The opinion by Justice Kavanaugh brushed aside Apple’s 
argument that the proper parties to bring a monopolization claim 
were the suppliers who dealt directly with Apple, noting: “Leaving 
consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers simply because 
upstream suppliers could also sue the retailers makes little sense 
and would directly contradict the longstanding goal of effective 
private enforcement and consumer protection in antitrust cases.”108 
Justice Kavanaugh also dismissed Apple’s argument about the 
potential complexity of damage calculations, stating: “Illinois Brick 
is not a get-out-of-court-free card for monopolistic retailers to play 
any time that a damages calculation might be complicated.”109  
 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 325 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 101 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2019). 
 102 Id. at 1519. 
 103 Id. at 1515. 
 104 See id. at 1520, 1525. 
 105 Id. at 1519. 
 106 See id. at 1523–24. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 1524. 
 109 Id. 
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In its close, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion returned to the 
theme that the Sherman Act should be interpreted consistently 
with its pro-consumer purposes.110 Justice Kavanaugh said: “The 
plaintiffs seek to hold retailers to account if the retailers engage 
in unlawful anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers who 
purchase from those retailers. That is why we have antitrust 
law.”111 The opinion went on to note that from the Sherman Act’s 
inception “‘protecting consumers from monopoly prices’ has been 
‘the central concern of antitrust.’”112 
Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.113 He treated Illinois 
Brick as an application of the general rule that statutory causes 
of action are ‘‘limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately 
caused by violations of the statute.”114 Justice Gorsuch reasoned 
that Illinois Brick rejected a suit by indirect purchasers because 
the plaintiffs in that case were relying on pass-on theory of 
damages that was inconsistent with the common law proximate 
cause rule.115 Justice Gorsuch then criticized the majority for 
allowing “a pass-on case” based on a formalistic and overly 
narrow interpretation of Illinois Brick.116 
The dissent by Justice Gorsuch also noted the practical 
difficulties of adjudicating the plaintiffs’ antitrust claim: “Will 
the court hear testimony to determine the market power of each 
app developer, how each set its prices, and what it might have 
charged consumers for apps if Apple’s commission had been 
lower?”117 In addition, Justice Gorsuch criticized Justice 
Kavanaugh for preferring a broad reading of the Sherman Act to 
“the well-trodden path of construing the statutory text in light of 
background common law principles of proximate cause.”118 
For purposes of this Article, the important takeaway from 
Apple Inc. is how differently Justice Kavanaugh and Justice 
Gorsuch viewed federal regulation. Justice Kavanaugh favored a 
liberal construction of the Sherman Act that would ensure that 
all of the law’s regulatory goals could be achieved.119 Justice 
Gorsuch did not worry about incomplete enforcement.120 His 
 
 110 See id. at 1525. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 114 Id. at 1527 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 
U.S. 118, 132 (2014)). 
 115 See id. at 1525–26. 
 116 See id. at 1526. 
 117 Id. at 1528. 
 118 Id. at 1530. 
 119 See id. at 1525. 
 120 See id. at 1525–31. 
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concern was with the law going too far, so he preferred reading 
into the statute principles taken from common law traditions to 
make sure the federal statute limited damages liability to private 
parties that had actually caused the alleged harm.121  
Justice Kavanaugh wanted to protect society from the 
machinations of big companies, particularly those companies that 
violate the spirit of the law in crafty ways and then seek shelter 
in made-up technical defenses.122 He sympathized with those 
seeking to enforce the law and with the people the statute was 
intended to protect.123 He had much less concern for the supposed 
rights of alleged law-breakers.124 By contrast, Justice Gorsuch 
took a skeptical attitude toward law enforcement and its 
tendency toward mission creep.125 His sympathies were with 
those subject to federal regulation.126 
B. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries127 
A similar conflict between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice 
Gorsuch took place in DeVries, a case involving the application of 
federal maritime law to a products liability claim.128 Two sailors, 
John DeVries and Kenneth McAfee, were exposed to asbestos 
while serving in the U.S. Navy (DeVries in the 1950s and McAfee 
in the 1980s).129 They later developed cancer, allegedly caused by 
asbestos exposure.130 The former sailors did not sue the asbestos 
manufacturers because those companies were in bankruptcy, and 
they believed they could not sue the Navy because of a 1950 
Supreme Court precedent.131 Instead, the sailors and their wives 
filed suit against companies that had supplied the Navy with 
products such as pumps, blowers, and turbines to which the 
Navy had later added asbestos.132 The theory of liability was that 
the defendant companies should have warned them about the 
dangers of asbestos insulation, so that the former sailors would 
have known to wear respiratory masks and avoid the hazard.133  
 
 121 See id. at 1530. 
 122 See id. at 1524 (majority opinion). 
 123 See id. at 1524–25. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. at 1525–31 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 126 See id. at 1529–30. 
 127 See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019). 
 128 Id. at 991. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. at 992 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)) (concluding “that 
the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen 
where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service”). 
 132 See id. 
 133 Id. 
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The cases were commenced in state court and later removed 
to federal court because they fell within the federal maritime 
jurisdiction.134 The district court granted the defendants’ motions 
for summary judgment, relying on the traditional common law 
“bare-metal” defense, under which product manufacturers have 
no duty to warn about the dangers of materials that are not in 
their products at the time of sale.135 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit reversed in accordance with a modern 
products liability rule that requires manufacturers to warn about 
the dangers of added materials if it is foreseeable that the 
materials might be added to the product after sale.136 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected both the “bare-metal” 
defense followed by the district court and the “foreseeable risk” 
test of the Court of Appeals.137 Instead, the Court adopted a 
somewhat less plaintiff-friendly, modern rule followed in some 
jurisdictions under which “a product manufacturer has a duty to 
warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the 
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated 
product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the 
manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will 
realize that danger.”138  
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh and 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and the Court’s four liberal 
Justices.139 Justice Kavanaugh began by emphasizing that 
federal courts have great freedom to shape federal maritime law, 
noting: “When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as 
a federal ‘common law court,’ much as state courts do in state 
common-law cases.”140 Justice Kavanaugh went on to emphasize 
that in formulating maritime law, courts were not bound by what 
was done in the past, but instead may consider “judicial opinions, 
legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings.”141 
Justice Kavanaugh said that while there was a general duty 
to warn about risks in one’s products, there were disagreements 
among courts as to what that entailed when the risks came from 
added materials.142 Some jurisdictions followed the “bare-metal” 
defense under which there was no duty to warn about the risks of 
materials added after sale, some jurisdictions went by the 
 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See id. (citing In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 873 F.3d 232, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
 137 See id. at 991. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 986. 
 140 Id. at 992 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008)). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See id. at 993. 
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foreseeable risk approach, and some courts followed what Justice 
Kavanaugh described as an intermediate approach.143 Justice 
Kavanaugh decided that the intermediate approach would be the 
best policy choice, reasoning that the foreseeability test would be 
too costly and result in “overwarning” users (with an 
overwhelmingly long list of potential hazards), while the  
bare-metal defense would not do enough to promote safety.144 
Justice Kavanaugh explained why it was a good idea for the 
Supreme Court to use its discretion to shape maritime law to 
provide plaintiffs with more protection than afforded by the 
traditional common law, noting: “Maritime law has always 
recognized a ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ of those who 
undertake to ‘venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea 
voyages.’”145 Justice Kavanaugh went on: “The plaintiffs in this 
case are the families of veterans who served in the U.S. Navy. 
Maritime law’s longstanding solicitude for sailors reinforces our 
decision to require a warning in these circumstances.”146 
Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, which was joined by 
Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.147 He argued that the 
traditional common law bare-metal defense was the proper rule 
whereas the more modern standard adopted by the majority did 
not enjoy “meaningful roots in the common law.”148 Justice 
Gorsuch cited the Restatement (Third) of Torts from 1997 for the 
proposition that “the supplier of a product generally must warn 
about only those risks associated with the product itself, not 
those associated with the ‘products and systems into which [it 
later may be] integrated.’”149 
Justice Gorsuch argued that “the traditional common law 
rule still makes the most sense today” because “[t]he 
manufacturer of a product is in the best position to understand 
and warn users about its risks” and therefore should be the one 
who has the duty to warn about product hazards.150 Expanding 
the duty to warn was not a good idea, Justice Gorsuch explained 
because “we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn about 
the dangers of its products when we require other people to share 
the duty to warn and its corresponding costs.”151 
 
 143 See id. at 993–94. 
 144 See id. at 994–95. 
 145 Id. at 995 (quoting Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 285 (1980)). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 148 See id. at 996–97. 
 149 Id. at 997. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See id. at 997–98. 
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Justice Gorsuch also argued that the traditional common law 
fit consumer expectations. “A home chef who buys a butcher’s 
knife may expect to read warnings about the dangers of knives 
but not about the dangers of undercooked meat. Likewise, a 
purchaser of gasoline may expect to see warnings at the pump 
about its flammability but not about the dangers of recklessly 
driving a car.”152 
Justice Gorsuch criticized the majority for replacing a clear 
common law rule with an opaque standard that courts would find 
hard to administer.153 Justice Gorsuch then raised a fairness 
argument: “Decades ago, the bare metal defendants produced their 
lawful products and provided all the warnings the law required. 
Now, they are at risk of being held responsible retrospectively for 
failing to warn about other people’s products.”154 He argued that 
“[i]t is a duty they could not have anticipated then and one they 
cannot discharge now. They can only pay. Of course, that may be 
the point.”155 Justice Gorsuch then went on to argue that the 
Court might be “motivated by the unfortunate facts of this 
particular case, where the sailors’ widows appear to have a limited 
prospect of recovery from the companies that supplied the asbestos 
(they’ve gone bankrupt) and from the Navy that allegedly directed 
the use of asbestos (it’s likely immune under our precedents).”156  
Nevertheless, Justice Gorsuch went on, sympathy for the 
plaintiffs did not justify imposing liability on innocent 
manufacturers: “how were they supposed to anticipate many 
decades ago the novel duty to warn placed on them today? People 
should be able to find the law in the books; they should not find 
the law coming upon them out of nowhere.”157 
Once again, Justice Kavanaugh sympathized with those 
seeking to enforce federal law, and those needing the protection 
of federal law. Justice Gorsuch’s sympathies were with those who 
needed protection from federal law. Justice Kavanaugh saw the 
law as something flexible that judges should update for the 
better protection of the people. Justice Gorsuch saw the law as 
fixed; something that private parties could count on, not 
something that could be changed years later so as to punish 
defendants for conduct that was legal at the time it was done.  
Justice Kavanaugh preferred a modern, consumer-protective 
version of the common law that expanded the scope of corporate 
 
 152 Id. at 998. 
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 155 Id. at 999–1000. 
 156 Id. at 1000. 
 157 Id. 
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responsibility, although he was careful to adopt an intermediate 
step and not the most plaintiff-friendly approach. Justice 
Gorsuch opted for the traditional common law rule that limited 
the duty to warn to the party best situated to fulfill that duty, 
even though that construction of the law meant ruling against 
sympathetic plaintiffs.  
C. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas158 
In Tennessee Wine and Spirits, a Tennessee statute required 
people applying for a license to operate a retail liquor store to 
have lived in the state for at least two years prior to their 
application.159 Normally, laws that impose durational residency 
requirements on citizens seeking state benefits are deemed 
unconstitutional because they violate the free trade and free 
travel principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause.160 The 
question before the Supreme Court in Tennessee Wine and Spirits 
was whether there was an exception to that general rule based 
on Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.161 Section 2 was 
enacted as part of the deal that repealed the Eighteenth 
Amendment (the Prohibition Amendment) and, by its terms, 
gives states the power to regulate the transportation or 
importation of liquor.162 
The Supreme Court struck down the state law by a vote of 
seven-to-two. The majority opinion by Justice Alito followed 
modern precedents to construe Section 2 of the Twenty-First 
Amendment narrowly.163 According to the majority, Section 2 
authorized states to enact “alcohol-related public health and 
safety measures” but was “not a license to impose all manner of 
protectionist restrictions on commerce in alcoholic beverages.”164 
The opinion concluded that “[b]ecause Tennessee’s 2-year 
residency requirement for retail license applicants blatantly 
favors the State’s residents and has little relationship to public 
health and safety, it is unconstitutional.”165 
Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined 
only by Justice Thomas. While agreeing that Section 2 did not 
give states the power to violate all manner of constitutional 
rights, Justice Gorsuch argued that the constitutional provision did 
allow states to escape the free trade principles the Supreme Court 
 
 158 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). 
 159 Id. at 2457. 
 160 See id. 
 161 See id. at 2459. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See id. at 2476. 
 164 Id. at 2457. 
 165 Id. 
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had read into the Dormant Commerce Clause.166 Invoking history, 
Justice Gorsuch said that both before the Prohibition Amendment 
and after its repeal, “one thing has always held true: States may 
impose residency requirements on those who seek to sell alcohol 
within their borders to ensure that retailers comply with local laws 
and norms.”167 
The bulk of the dissent was spent debating the majority’s take 
on history and modern precedents under the dormant Commerce 
Clause and Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.168 But in its 
closing paragraph, the dissent spoke to the philosophical issues that 
prompted Justice Gorsuch to disagree with the majority of the 
Court.169 The paragraph began: “As judges, we may be sorely 
tempted to ‘rationalize’ the law and impose our own free-trade rules 
for all goods and services in interstate commerce.”170 That 
temptation should be resisted, Justice Gorsuch argued, because 
“real life is not always so tidy and satisfactory, and neither are the 
democratic compromises we are bound to respect as judges. Like it 
or not, those who adopted the Twenty-first Amendment took the 
view that reasonable people can disagree about the costs and 
benefits of free trade in alcohol.”171 Justice Gorsuch went on: “Under 
the terms of the compromise they hammered out, the regulation of 
alcohol wasn’t left to the imagination of a committee of nine sitting 
in Washington, D.C., but to the judgment of the people themselves 
and their local elected representatives.”172 
In a footnote, the majority opinion by Justice Alito addressed 
this passage in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, characterizing it as 
“empty rhetoric” and noting that even the dissent strayed “from a 
blinkered reading” of Section 2 by conceding that the provision 
did “not abrogate all previously adopted constitutional 
provisions, just the dormant Commerce Clause.”173 
The Tennessee Wine and Spirits decision illustrates key 
differences between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch. 
Justice Kavanaugh favors national norms over provincial 
interests. Justice Gorsuch prefers to defend localities from the 
(supposed) overreach of the federal government. Justice 
Kavanaugh is happy to be part of the Washington, D.C., 
consensus. Justice Gorsuch will go out of his way to defy it. He is 
also willing to use sweeping anti-Washington, D.C., rhetoric, even 
 
 166 Id. at 2477. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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 173 Id. at 2468 n.15 (majority opinion). 
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when the logic of that rhetoric might go further than he actually 
wants to go. It is also worth noting that Justice Gorsuch is 
sympathetic to state regulation of business; his anti-government 
sentiment seems to be limited to the federal authorities.  
D. Flowers v. Mississippi174 
The defendant in Flowers, Curtis Flowers, was convicted in 
Mississippi state court of murdering four people in Winona, 
Mississippi, in 1996.175 It was his sixth trial for the crime.176 The 
first three trials resulted in convictions that were reversed by the 
Mississippi Supreme Court because of prosecutorial 
misconduct.177 The fourth and fifth trials resulted in hung 
juries.178 The question before the Supreme Court was whether, in 
Flowers’ sixth trial, the prosecutor improperly struck Carolyn 
Wright, a black prospective juror, for racially discriminatory 
reasons in violation of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court in 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky.179 
The Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court 
and ruled for the defendant by a vote of seven-to-two.180 The 
majority opinion by Justice Kavanaugh concluded that “[f]our 
critical facts, taken together, require reversal.”181 The first fact 
was that “in the six trials combined, the State employed its 
peremptory challenges to strike 41 of the 42 black prospective 
jurors that it could have struck.”182 The second critical fact was 
that in Flowers’ sixth trial, the one that had resulted in the 
conviction under review, “the State exercised peremptory strikes 
against five of the six black prospective jurors.”183 The third fact 
was that at the sixth trial, “in an apparent effort to find 
pretextual reasons to strike black prospective jurors, the State 
engaged in dramatically disparate questioning of black and white 
prospective jurors.”184 The fourth critical fact, according to 
Justice Kavanaugh, was that “the State then struck at least one 
black prospective juror, Carolyn Wright, who was similarly 
situated to white prospective jurors who were not struck by the 
State.”185 
 
 174 Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). 
 175 Id. at 2234–35. 
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Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the narrow, fact-bound basis 
of the Court’s decision, noting: “We need not and do not decide 
that any one of those four facts alone would require reversal.” He 
stated “. . . all that we do decide, is that all of the relevant facts 
and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court 
committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory 
strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not 
‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’”186 
Justice Kavanaugh went on: “In reaching that conclusion, we 
break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce 
Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”187 
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent. In its first three sections, 
which Justice Gorsuch joined, Justice Thomas went over the 
factual record of jury selection for the six trials in detail.188 
Noting that the defendant and the victims came from a small 
town with connections to many in the jury pool, Justice Thomas 
discussed the prosecutor’s nondiscriminatory reasons for forty of 
the forty-one peremptory challenges that he used against black 
prospective jurors.189 Justice Thomas also noted that the one 
improper peremptory challenge had been used twenty years 
earlier in a trial that did not result in the conviction under 
review.190 
With respect to the most recent trial and the striking of 
Wright, Justice Thomas noted that, shortly after the murders, 
Wright was sued by Tardy Furniture, a business that was owned 
by one of the victims and later, at the time of the suit against 
Wright, by that victim’s son and daughter.191 The store’s suit 
against Wright resulted in a garnishment order against her.192 
Justice Thomas concluded that Wright’s potential bias was 
“obvious,” so that it was not unconstitutional racial 
discrimination for the prosecution to strike her.193  
Justice Thomas said that the Court should have followed its 
normal practice of not granting certiorari to review fact-specific 
cases.194 He speculated that the Court might have granted review 
“because the case [had] received a fair amount of media 
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attention.”195 Alternatively, Justice Thomas speculated, the Court 
might have taken the case for review because it came “from a state 
court in the South.”196 Justice Thomas noted that “[t]hese courts 
are ‘familiar objects of the Court’s scorn,’ especially in cases 
involving race.”197 
This decision illustrates Justice Kavanaugh’s support for civil 
rights and willingness to use federal power to hold state 
governments to national standards. It also shows his pragmatic, 
fact-bound approach to adjudication. On the other hand, Justice 
Gorsuch’s willingness to join the portions of Justice Thomas’ dissent 
that questioned the factual basis of the Court’s decision illustrates 
that Justice Gorsuch is apt to challenge the dominant narrative and 
defy Washington, D.C., norms. His opposition is not all that 
conservative. Justice Gorsuch did not want to overrule the Batson 
precedent and he seems generally supportive of modern civil rights 
law. But in a factual dispute over the reach of federal law, Justice 
Gorsuch rejected the views of the D.C. establishment and sided with 
an object of its scorn. 
III. JUSTICE GORSUCH WITH JUSTICE GINSBURG AGAINST JUSTICE 
KAVANAUGH 
Justice Gorsuch’s skepticism about federal power often put 
him on the same side as Justice Ginsburg and opposite Justice 
Kavanaugh.198 This section examines four examples—all with a 
connecting theme. In each of these cases, Justice Gorsuch 
opposed the federal government (or, in one case, a party that was 
acting as the U.S. government’s successor in interest) while 
Justice Kavanaugh took the side of the federal government (or its 
successor in interest).199 
A. Biestek v. Berryhill200 
In Biestek, Michael Biestek (a former carpenter suffering 
from degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression) 
applied for social security disability benefits.201 Even though 
Biestek was no longer able to perform his customary construction 
work, the Social Security Administration opposed his application 
on the theory that there were other jobs in the economy he could 
perform.202  
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 197 Id. (citations omitted). 
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At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, a 
vocational expert hired by the government testified that there 
were “240,000 bench assembler jobs and 120,000 sorter jobs” 
available to someone with Biestek’s education and disabilities.203 
On cross-examination, Biestek’s lawyer asked for the data 
supporting that conclusion.204 The Administrative Law Judge 
ruled that the supporting data was not necessary and then relied 
on the expert’s testimony in her decision, which granted Biestek 
disability benefits beginning in May 2013 (when he turned fifty) 
but denied prior benefits because of the availability of the other 
jobs.205 
Biestek filed suit in federal court to recover the denied 
benefits, arguing that because the data supporting the expert’s 
report had not been disclosed, the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge was not supported by substantial evidence and 
therefore should be overturned.206 The district court rejected this 
argument, as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit.207 On review, the Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of 
six-to-three.208 
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kagan and joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer, Justice 
Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh. The majority opinion reasoned that 
the substantial evidence standard is flexible and does not require 
“a categorical rule, applying to every case in which a vocational 
expert refuses a request for underlying data.”209 Rather, judicial 
review of whether an administrative decision was supported by 
substantial evidence should be “case-by-case” under a standard 
that “takes into account all features of the vocational expert’s 
testimony, as well as the rest of the administrative record” and 
“defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up 
close.”210 
The three dissenters were Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Sotomayor, and Justice Gorsuch. In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch 
employed the striking rhetorical device of presenting the case 
from the plaintiff’s perspective.211 His opinion began: “Walk for a 
moment in Michael Biestek’s shoes. As part of your application 
for disability benefits, you’ve proven that you suffer from serious 
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health problems and can’t return to your old construction job.” 
The opinion continued, “Like many cases, yours turns on whether 
a significant number of other jobs remain that someone of your 
age, education, and experience, and with your physical 
limitations, could perform.”212 
The opinion by Justice Gorsuch then went on to describe how 
the government introduced evidence that there were other jobs 
available, and how Biestek asked for the supporting data: “[b]ut 
rather than ordering the data produced, the hearing examiner, 
herself a Social Security Administration employee, jumps in to 
say that won’t be necessary.”213 The narrative concluded then, 
“Even without the data, the examiner states in her decision on 
your disability claim, the expert’s say-so warrants ‘great weight’ 
and is more than enough to evidence to deny your application. 
Case closed.”214 
Justice Gorsuch reviewed precedents under the substantial 
evidence standard and then argued: “If clearly mistaken 
evidence, fake evidence, speculative evidence, and conclusory 
evidence aren’t substantial evidence, the evidence here shouldn’t 
be either.”215 Not only was the expert’s testimony conclusory, 
Justice Gorsuch noted, “for all anyone can tell it may have come 
out of a hat—and, thus, may wind up being clearly mistaken, 
fake, or speculative evidence too.”216 
In his closing, Justice Gorsuch emphasized the values at 
stake.217 “The principle that the government must support its 
allegations with substantial evidence, not conclusions and secret 
evidence, guards against arbitrary executive decision[-]making. 
Without it, people like Mr. Biestek are left to the mercy of a 
bureaucrat’s caprice.”218 
Justice Kavanaugh did not write in this case, but he joined a 
majority opinion that saw a dispute between the federal 
government and an individual from the perspective of the 
government.219 Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, saw the same case 
from the perspective of the individual fighting with the 
government.220 For the majority, the federal government was 
treated as a positive force that should be given substantial 
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leeway to do its good work.221 For Justice Gorsuch, the federal 
government was an arrogant Leviathan that should be subject to 
close scrutiny and hemmed in by rules.222 For the majority, the 
Social Security Administration hearing examiner was someone 
whose discretionary judgment deserved deference.223 Justice 
Gorsuch, by contrast, regarded that same discretion as a 
“bureaucrat’s caprice.”224 
B. Gamble v. United States225 
In Gamble, Terance Gamble was pulled over by police officer in 
Mobile, Alabama, for driving a car with a damaged headlight.226 
Smelling marijuana, the officer searched the car and found not only 
marijuana but also a handgun, which Gamble as an ex-convict was 
not allowed to possess.227 Gamble pleaded guilty in state court to 
drug charges and possessing a gun while a convicted felon in 
violation of Alabama law.228 He was sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment, all but one year of which was suspended.229 
Thinking his state punishment too light, federal authorities indicted 
Gamble for possession a gun while an ex-convict in violation of 
federal law and Gamble received nearly three more years in 
prison.230 
Gamble challenged his federal conviction as violative of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides 
that “no person may be ‘twice put in jeopardy’ ‘for the same 
offence.’”231 The lower courts rejected Gamble’s argument, 
following long-standing Supreme Court precedent that violations 
of the laws of two different sovereigns are not “the same offence” 
within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.232 The 
Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of seven-to-two.233 
The majority opinion by Justice Alito noted the textual basis 
for the dual-sovereignty doctrine, which allows state and federal 
prosecution of the same conduct if that conduct separately 
violates state and federal law.234 The Fifth Amendment does not 
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prohibit dual prosecutions for the same conduct.235 It prohibits 
dual prosecutions for the same “offence.” Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion explained: “an ‘offence’ is defined by a law, and each law 
is defined by a sovereign. So where there are two sovereigns, 
there are two laws, and two ‘offences.’”236 
The majority opinion went on to argue that the dual-sovereignty 
rule was also consistent with the ethos of the founding generation.237 
One of the grievances against George III in the Declaration of 
Independence was that he used acquittals of British troops in English 
courts to bar their prosecution in the colonies.238 Justice Alito noted it 
did not make sense that “the same Founders who quite literally 
revolted against the use of acquittals abroad to bar criminal 
prosecutions here would soon give us an Amendment allowing 
foreign acquittals to spare domestic criminals.”239 
The majority opinion reviewed the Supreme Court case law 
establishing the dual-sovereignty doctrine in the 1840s and then 
reaffirming the dual-sovereignty doctrine in numerous later 
decisions.240 Justice Alito went on to argue that the old precedents 
and treatises that Mr. Gamble cited to support his contrary 
position were a “muddle” or “spotty” or “equivocal” and therefore 
not enough to establish that the Framers intended to “bar 
successive prosecutions under different sovereigns’ laws—much 
less do so with enough force to break a chain of precedent linking 
dozens of cases over 170 years.”241 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, which said “the 
historical record [did] not bear out [his] initial skepticism of the 
dual-sovereignty doctrine.”242 The opinion went on to say that 
while the case presented “knotty issues about the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment,” it did not appear that the 
common law had “coalesced” around the defendant’s 
interpretation of double jeopardy right at the time the Fifth 
Amendment was ratified.243 
The two dissenters were Justice Ginsburg and Justice 
Gorsuch. The dissent by Justice Gorsuch began: “A free society 
does not allow its government to try the same individual for the 
same crime until it’s happy with the result. Unfortunately, the 
 
 235 Id. at 1965. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 1983–84 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 238 Id. at 1965–66 (majority opinion). 
 239 Id. at 1966. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 1969. 
 242 Id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 243 Id. at 1987. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 1:41 PM 
366 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:2 
Court today endorses a colossal exception to this ancient rule 
against double jeopardy.”244 
The next paragraph of the dissent started with a quote from a 
1959 dissenting opinion by Justice Hugo Black.245 Justice Gorsuch 
then stated the same thought in his own words: “Throughout 
history, people have worried about the vast disparity of power 
between governments and individuals, the capacity of the state to 
bring charges repeatedly until it wins the result it wants, and 
what little would be left of human liberty if that power remained 
unchecked.”246 
The dissent by Justice Gorsuch traced the history of the 
double jeopardy prohibition, starting with ancient Athens and 
the Old Testament and then proceeding through the English 
common law to early American precedents,247 and argued that 
the term “offence” was and should be understood broadly.248 
Justice Gorsuch buttressed this view with common sense, noting 
that: “Most any ordinary speaker of English would say that Mr. 
Gamble was tried twice for ‘the same offence,’ precisely what the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits.”249 
Justice Gorsuch went on to argue that early American law 
was consistent with this understanding of double jeopardy, the 
Supreme Court’s adoption of the dual-sovereignty doctrine was a 
mistake, and there was no legitimate reason to perpetuate the 
error.250 The dissent noted: “In the era when the separate 
sovereigns exception first emerged, the federal criminal code was 
new, thin, modest, and restrained. Today, it can make none of 
those boasts.”251 According to some estimates, the dissent 
observed, “the U.S. Code contains more than 4,500 criminal 
statutes, not even counting the hundreds of thousands of federal 
regulations that can trigger criminal penalties.”252 Justice 
Gorsuch went on: “Still others suggest that ‘[t]here is no one in 
the United States over the age of 18 who cannot be indicted for 
some federal crime.’”253 
In a closing paragraph of his dissent, Justice Gorsuch 
returned to his main themes. The paragraph began: “Enforcing 
the Constitution always bears its costs. But when the people 
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adopted the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, they thought the 
liberties promised there worth the costs. It is not for this Court to 
reassess this judgment to make the prosecutor’s job easier.”254 
Justice Gorsuch went on to explain the importance of the double 
jeopardy rule: “When governments may unleash all their might 
in multiple prosecutions against an individual, exhausting 
themselves only when those who hold the reins of power are 
content with the result, it is ‘the poor and the weak,’ and the 
unpopular and controversial, who suffer first . . . .”255 
Thus, Justice Kavanaugh joined a majority opinion that took 
the side of law enforcement, the federal government, the welfare 
of society, and the status quo.256 Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, 
resolved ambiguities in favor of liberty and against the federal 
government.257 His overriding concern was with the rights of 
individuals.258 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch was willing to overturn 
170 years of precedent, based on a historical record that even a 
sympathetic Justice Thomas saw as inconclusive, in order to 
restrain federal power.259 The opinion illustrates the selectivity of 
Justice Gorsuch’s originalism. He embraces those parts of the 
past that protect individual liberty from an arbitrary or 
overzealous federal government. He is not a reactionary, seeking 
to restore some actual period in the past. His devotion is to an 
ideal. 
As a matter of literary style, it is also worth noting that 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion referred to the defendant as 
“Gamble”260 (which is normal), while Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting 
opinion referred to the defendant as “Mr. Gamble,”261 in much the 
same way that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in the Biestek case 
referred to the plaintiff as “Mr. Biestek.” The addition of the 
honorific illustrates Justice Gorsuch’s tendency to show greater 
respect for the individual. 
C. United States v. Haymond262 
In Haymond, Andre Haymond was convicted of possessing 
child pornography in violation of federal law.263 The statute 
authorized a punishment of zero to ten years in prison, plus 
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supervised release for a period of five years to life.264 “Because Mr. 
Haymond had no criminal history and was working to help support 
his mother who had suffered a stroke, the judge . . . sentenced him 
to a prison term of 38 months, followed by 10 years of supervised 
release.”265 
Haymond served his prison term but ran into problems 
during supervised release.266 An unannounced government 
search of his computers and cell phone turned up fifty-nine 
images of what the government claimed to be child pornography. 
Subsequently, the government initiated supervised release 
revocation proceedings.267 The district court judge held a hearing 
without a jury and found that it was more likely than not that 
Haymond had knowingly downloaded thirteen images of child 
pornography.268 
Normally, revocation of supervised release means that the 
district court judge has discretion to resentence the defendant to 
a period of imprisonment within the limits of the original 
sentencing range.269 But a provision added to the Sentencing 
Reform Act in 2003 and amended in 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), 
created a special rule.270 Under § 3583(k), if a defendant “on 
supervised release committed one of several enumerated 
offenses, including the possession of child pornography, the judge 
must impose an additional prison term of at least five years and 
up to life without regard to the length of the prison term 
authorized for the defendant’s initial crime of conviction.”271 
Because of the statutory provision, the federal district court 
judge felt bound to sentence Haymond to five more years in 
prison, but he added that were it not for § 3583(k), he probably 
would have added a prison term “in the range of two years or 
less.”272 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that § 3583(k) violated the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases because it mandated 
a new and higher statutory minimum based on facts that had not 
been proven to a jury.273 
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On review, the Supreme Court ruled for Haymond by a vote 
of five-to-four.274 There were three opinions. Justice Gorsuch 
wrote a plurality opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan.275 Justice Breyer wrote a solo 
concurrence.276 Justice Alito wrote a dissent, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kavanaugh.277 
Justice Gorsuch began the plurality opinion with a 
statement of first principles: “Only a jury, acting on proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, may take a person’s liberty. That promise 
stands as one of the Constitution’s most vital protections against 
arbitrary government.”278 After recounting the background of the 
case, the plurality opinion returned to this theme. Quoting the 
papers of John Adams, the opinion said: “Together with the right 
to vote, those who wrote our Constitution considered the right to 
trial by jury ‘the heart and lungs . . .’ of our liberties, without 
which ‘the body must die; . . . the government must become 
arbitrary.’”279 Justice Gorsuch went on, again relying on the 
Adams papers: “Just as the right to vote sought to preserve the 
people’s authority over their government’s executive and 
legislative functions, the right to a jury trial sought to preserve 
the people’s authority over its judicial functions.”280 Justice 
Gorsuch then explained that, to secure this goal, “the Framers 
adopted the Sixth Amendment’s promise that ‘[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury.’ In the Fifth Amendment, they 
added that no one may be deprived of liberty without ‘due process 
of law.’”281 He continued, “Together, these pillars of the Bill of 
Rights ensure that the government must prove to a jury every 
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt, an ancient rule that 
has ‘extend[ed] down centuries.’”282  
Applying these principles, Justice Gorsuch held that § 3583(k) 
was unconstitutional because it mandated a minimum sentence of 
five years in prison for Haymond for new misconduct without giving 
him the right to a jury trial and without requiring the government 
to prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt.283 
Justice Gorsuch rejected the government’s argument that 
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revocation of supervised release under § 3583(k) was not a criminal 
prosecution within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.284 Citing 
precedent, Justice Gorsuch said that “any ‘increase in a defendant’s 
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact’ requires 
a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt ‘no matter’ what the 
government chooses to call the exercise.”285 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence indicated that he did not 
believe jury trials were normally required for revocation of 
supervised release, but that § 3583(k) was an exception because 
the statute only applied to a discrete set of criminal offenses, took 
away the judge’s discretion to determine whether supervised 
release should be revoked, and required a mandatory minimum 
of five years in prison.286 Justice Alito’s dissent took mild 
issue with Justice Breyer, saying he was wrong but giving him 
credit for a narrow opinion that “saved [their] jurisprudence from 
the consequences of the plurality opinion . . . .”287 Justice Alito 
then trained his heavy artillery on the opinion written by his 
fellow Republican appointee: “[The plurality opinion] . . . is not 
based on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, is 
irreconcilable with precedent, and sports rhetoric with 
potentially revolutionary implications. The plurality opinion 
appears to have been carefully crafted for the purpose of laying 
the groundwork for later decisions of much broader scope.”288 
Justice Alito attacked Justice Gorsuch’s sweeping language 
about the Sixth Amendment jury trial right because it suggested 
that jury trials might be required for all supervised release 
revocation proceedings and not just those under § 3583(k).289 
Justice Alito warned that this was impractical.290 In 2018, 
Justice Alito noted, the “federal district courts completed 1,809 
criminal jury trials” and “16,946 revocations of supervised 
release.”291 Justice Alito said there was “simply no way that the 
federal courts could empanel enough juries to adjudicate all those 
[supervised release revocations] . . . .”292 
Turning to Justice Gorsuch’s legal analysis, Justice Alito 
dismissed his historical support as irrelevant, noting: “John 
Adams was not writing about the Sixth Amendment when he 
made a diary entry in 1771 or when he wrote to William Pym in 
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1766.”293 Citing the language of the Sixth Amendment and 
various precedents, Justice Alito argued that a defendant was 
the “accused” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment only 
through the initial prosecution.294 After a judgment of conviction, 
the defendant became the “convicted,”295 and the “criminal 
prosecution” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right 
was over.296 Justice Alito buttressed his interpretation with 
historical practice of parole and probation revocation hearings to 
conclude that it was “a clear historical fact” that “American juries 
have simply played ‘no role’ in the administration of previously 
imposed sentences.”297 
Justice Gorsuch responded by taking a broad view of the 
policies animating the Sixth Amendment, stating: “The 
Constitution seeks to safeguard the people’s control over the 
business of judicial punishments by ensuring that any accusation 
triggering a new and additional punishment is proven to the 
satisfaction of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”298 Justice 
Gorsuch criticized the dissent for giving the government too 
much power, noting: “If the government and dissent were correct, 
Congress could require anyone convicted of even a modest crime 
to serve a sentence of supervised release for the rest of his life. At 
that point, a judge could try and convict him of any violation of 
the terms of his release under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, and then sentence him to pretty much anything.”299 
Justice Gorsuch responded to the dissent’s practical 
objections with the argument that, “like much else in our 
Constitution, the jury system isn’t designed to promote efficiency 
but to protect liberty.”300 He went on to quote from William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, an 18th Century treatise on English 
law, that threats to the jury trial right would come in the form of 
subtle machinations and that no matter how “convenient” these 
incursions “may appear at first, (as doubtless all arbitrary 
powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet let it be again 
remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in the forms 
of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their 
liberty in more substantial matters.”301 
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Once again, Justice Gorsuch resolved doubts in favor of 
liberty and against the federal government. He scoured the 
treatises of the past, finding support for his understanding of 
their ideals. He favored the rights of individuals over the 
supposed welfare of society. Justice Gorsuch sought to protect 
people like Andre Haymond from the U.S. government. Justice 
Kavanaugh took the opposing view, joining Justice Alito’s 
defense of federal power and recognizing the practical needs of 
law enforcement. Unlike Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh 
sought to protect society from people like Andre Haymond. 
D. Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.302 
Another illustration of Justice Gorsuch and Justice Ginsburg 
taking the same side, with Justice Kavanaugh opposed, is 
Washington State Department of Licensing. The State of 
Washington taxed the importation of motor fuel through ground 
transportation.303 The question before the Supreme Court was 
whether an 1855 treaty between the Yakama Nation and the 
U.S. Government barred the State from imposing that tax on 
Cougar Den, a company owned by a member of the Yakama 
Nation and incorporated under Yakama law that trucked motor 
fuel over public highways to the Yakama reservation.304  
In exchange for ten million acres of Yakama land (a quarter 
of what is now the State of Washington), the 1855 treaty gave 
members of the Yakama Nation various rights.305 The treaty 
promised the Yakamas, inter alia, “the right, in common with 
citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public 
highways.”306 Cougar Den argued that this meant Yakamas could 
import fuel by highway without being subject to state taxes.307 
The State of Washington argued that the treaty simply meant 
that the State could not discriminate against the Yakamas and 
that since the motor fuel importation tax applied to all citizens it 
was proper.308 
By a vote of five-to-four, the Supreme Court ruled for Cougar 
Den.309 The majority coalition consisted of the Court’s four liberal 
Justices and Justice Gorsuch. The plurality opinion by Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor, was 
careful to limit its scope to protecting the Yakamas from the 
 
 302 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).  
 303 Id. at 1006. 
 304 Id.  
 305 Id. at 1007. 
 306 Id.  
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. at 1009. 
 309 See id. at 1000.  
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 1:41 PM 
2021] Supreme Court Justices Clash 373 
particular tax at issue and not to impugn State power over the 
Yakamas in a variety of other circumstances.310 
Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, that was far more sweeping in its scope.311 His opinion 
began by noting that “[t]he Yakamas have lived in the Pacific 
Northwest for centuries,”312 and observed that they gave up ten 
million acres of their land in exchange for rights under the 1855 
treaty with the United States.313 He described the Court’s task as 
the “modest one” of construing the treaty to adopt “the 
interpretation most consistent with the treaty’s original 
meaning.”314 That meaning, Justice Gorsuch was careful to 
emphasize, was not what the government might have 
understood, but rather what the treaty meant to the Yakamas. 
Quoting precedent, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Supreme 
Court “must ‘give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves 
would have understood them.’”315 He explained the basis for this 
rule: “After all, the United States drew up this contract, and we 
normally construe any ambiguities against the drafter who 
enjoys the power of the pen.”316 
Focusing on the language of the treaty, Justice Gorsuch 
acknowledged that “[t]o some modern ears, the right to travel in 
common with others might seem merely a right to use the roads 
subject to the same taxes and regulations as everyone else.”317 
However, he went on to note that the modern understanding of 
the words did not matter, because that was “not how the 
Yakamas understood the treaty’s terms”318 at the time the 1855 
treaty was signed. Citing factual findings from another treaty 
case, he explained that “[i]n the Yakama language, the phrase ‘in 
common with’ . . . suggest[ed] public use or general use without 
restriction.”319  
Justice Gorsuch argued that this reading of the treaty also 
made the most sense given the huge amount of land that the 
Yakamas surrendered pursuant to the deal. He noted that, under 
the government’s interpretation, the right to travel promised to 
tribal members under the treaty extended only to “the right to 
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venture out of their reservation and use the public highways like 
everyone else. But the record shows that the consideration the 
Yakamas supplied was worth far more than an abject promise 
they would not be made prisoners on their reservation.”320  
In his closing summation, Justice Gorsuch put the decision 
in a larger context, noting that the case really told “an old and 
familiar story.”321 The federal government took millions of acres 
of tribal land in exchange for “a handful of modest promises.”322 
Now, he observed, the government was dissatisfied with what it 
gave up in the deal: “It is a new day, and now it wants more.”323 
Justice Gorsuch gave the Supreme Court credit for holding the 
government to the terms of its bargain and further opined: “It is 
the least we can do.”324  
The main dissent was written by Chief Justice Roberts and 
joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh.325 Justice 
Kavanaugh also wrote a separate dissent in which Justice 
Thomas joined.326 In that dissent, Justice Kavanaugh interpreted 
the treaty language using a plain, common sense approach, 
reasoning that “[t]he treaty’s ‘in common with’ language means 
what it says. The treaty recognizes tribal members’ right to 
travel on off-reservation public highways on equal terms with 
other U.S. citizens.”327 He noted that the Yakamas had reason to 
accept this deal because in 1855 the government could have 
required the Yakamas to obtain special licenses before travelling 
off-reservation.328 
Justice Kavanaugh conceded that, under this reading, “the 
treaty as negotiated and written may not have turned out to be a 
particularly good deal for the Yakamas.”329 But in his view, that 
was not a legitimate concern for the Supreme Court because “[a]s 
a matter of separation of powers, . . . courts are bound by the text 
of the treaty.”330 Besides, Justice Kavanaugh noted, Congress 
later did many things to help the Yakamas.331 Therefore, he 
concluded, “lament about the terms of the treaty negotiated by 
the Federal Government and the Tribe in 1855 does not support 
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the Judiciary (as opposed to Congress and the President) 
rewriting the law in 2019.”332 
Once again, Justice Gorsuch leaned to the side of the 
individual and the group, while Justice Kavanaugh leaned 
toward the federal government. Justice Gorsuch was interested 
in what the treaty meant to those subject to federal power, while 
Justice Kavanaugh looked at the treaty language from a 
perspective sympathetic to the government. Justice Gorsuch 
resolved doubts against the federal government, while Justice 
Kavanaugh resolved ambiguities in its favor. Justice Gorsuch 
saw the federal government as the Yakamas’ exploiter; Justice 
Kavanaugh saw it as their benefactor. 
IV. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH AND JUSTICE GORSUCH, TOGETHER  
To balance this discussion of the differences in judicial 
philosophy between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch, it is 
informative to examine cases in which the two Justices’ views 
were aligned. Indeed, there exist many cases in which Justice 
Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch are in substantial agreement.333 
However, even where the Justices agree in the judgment, their 
reasoning often differs greatly.334 Justice Kavanaugh tries to 
express his views in a pragmatic, limited, moderate way that the 
D.C. community would likely find acceptable. Justice Gorsuch, by 
contrast, expresses his opinions in terms perhaps more pleasing 
to an intellectually conservative audience. 
A. Limiting Federal Power 
Justice Kavanaugh often agrees with Justice Gorsuch that 
particular applications of federal power are inappropriate. For 
example, in Iancu v. Brunetti,335 a six-to-three decision, both 
Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch joined an opinion by 
Justice Kagan holding that a provision of the Lanham Act 
denying trademark status to marks that were “immoral or 
scandalous” violated the First Amendment. In Dutra Group  
v. Batterton,336 another six-to-three opinion, Justice Kavanaugh 
and Justice Gorsuch joined an opinion by Justice Alito holding 
that punitive damages were not available on an unseaworthiness 
claim brought under federal maritime law. In Rucho v. Common 
 
 332 Id.  
 333 See infra, Part IV.A–C. 
 334 Compare Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S.Ct. 2067, 2093 (2019) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) with id. at 2103 (Gorsuch, J. concurring). 
 335 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019). 
 336 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019). 
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Cause,337 a five-to-four case, both Justices joined an opinion by 
Chief Justice Roberts holding that federal courts should not 
attempt to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.  
In Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,338 Justice Kavanaugh 
joined a plurality opinion by Justice Gorsuch that held that a 
Virginia statute that banned the mining of uranium was not 
implicitly preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act when the 
federal statute deliberately left the regulation of uranium mining 
to the States.339 The key reasoning of the opinion was that the 
Supreme Court was not free “to extend a federal statute to a 
sphere Congress was well aware of but chose to leave alone.”340 
Justice Gorsuch went on to explain: “Invoking some brooding 
federal interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference should 
never be enough to win preemption of a state law; a litigant must 
point specifically to ‘a constitutional text or a federal statute’ that 
does the displacing or conflicts with state law.”341 Despite his 
demonstrated sympathy toward federal power,342 Justice 
Kavanaugh joined this rationale in the context of a State law 
prohibiting uranium mining.343  
B. Abortion and the Death Penalty 
The two Justices do not differ significantly on hot-button 
social issues, such as abortion and the death penalty. For 
example, in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, 
Inc.,344 the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of a Court of 
Appeals decision that struck down an Indiana law prohibiting 
abortion clinics from knowingly providing sex-, race-, or 
disability-selective abortions.345 Both Justice Kavanaugh and 
Justice Gorsuch joined the decision, which was based on the 
absence of any disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal 
on the issue.346  
In June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee,347 the Supreme Court 
voted five-to-four to block implementation of a Louisiana statute that 
required doctors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at 
nearby hospitals.348 Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Justice 
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 338 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019). 
 339 Id. at 1900. 
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 341 Id. at 1901. 
 342 See, e.g., United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
 343 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019). 
 344 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). 
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 346 See id. at 1783–93 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 347 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019). 
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Thomas, Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch.349 The dissent, however, 
was very narrow.350 Justice Kavanaugh noted that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upholding the challenged law 
had predicted that the doctors who performed abortions would all be 
able to obtain the needed admitting privileges.351 The dissent also 
noted that the Louisiana law had a “45-day regulatory transition” 
period in which the law would not be enforced while the doctors 
sought admitting privileges.352 Therefore, Justice Kavanaugh 
concluded, he would deny the plaintiffs’ request to stay 
implementation of the law “without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ ability 
to bring a . . . motion for preliminary injunction at the conclusion of 
the 45-day regulatory transition period if the Fifth Circuit’s factual 
prediction about the doctors’ ability to obtain admitting privileges 
proves to be inaccurate.”353 
In Bucklew v. Precythe,354 a five-to-four decision, the 
Supreme Court set forth the standard for adjudicating challenges 
to a particular mode of execution (e.g. lethal injection) based on 
the prisoner’s particular medical condition.355 The majority 
opinion by Justice Gorsuch struck a conservative tone, flatly 
asserting: “The Constitution allows capital punishment.”356 
Justice Kavanaugh added a short concurring opinion that 
highlighted the liberal aspects of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion.357 
C. Differences in Agreement 
Sometimes, the daylight between Justice Kavanaugh and 
Justice Gorsuch is evident even when they are in agreement as to 
the result. For example, in Kisor v. Wilkie,358 the Veteran’s 
Administration denied retroactive disability benefits to a 
Vietnam veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder 
based on the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.359 
Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that argued that federal courts 
should not defer to agency interpretations of agency regulations, 
except to the extent that deference was warranted by genuine 
technical expertise.360 Justice Gorsuch reasoned that 
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 357 Id. at 1135–36 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
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 360 Id. at 2442–43. 
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“foundational principles” of constitutional law361 precluded 
deference to bureaucrats and required courts to utilize instead 
“the traditional tools of interpretation judges have employed for 
centuries to elucidate the law’s original public meaning.”362 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a short opinion that concurred with 
Justice Gorsuch but used a modern, common sense analogy, 
noting: “Umpires in games at Wrigley Field do not defer to the 
Cubs manager’s in-game interpretation of Wrigley’s ground 
rules.”363  
Another good example of how the two Justices’ reasoning can 
diverge, even when agreeing as to the result, is American Legion 
v. American Humanist Ass’n,364 a seven-to-two decision, that 
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Bladensburg 
Peace Cross, a 94-year-old memorial raised on public land to 
honor World War I casualties.365 Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring 
opinion set forth a complex multi-element standard for courts to 
use in determining when government practices would 
“ordinarily” survive Establishment Clause challenge.366 Justice 
Kavanaugh then applied that standard to conclude the war 
memorial did not violate the Constitution because it was not 
coercive and was rooted in history and tradition.367 He professed 
“deep respect for the plaintiffs’ sincere objections to seeing the 
cross on public land”368 and further recognized a supporting 
amicus group’s “sense of distress and alienation.”369 Rather than 
endorse an Establishment Clause action, he instead suggested 
other methods by which these groups could secure removal of the 
cross.370 
In contrast, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion bordered on dismissive. 
In concurrence, he wrote: “The American Humanist Association 
wants a federal court to order the destruction of a 94-year-old war 
memorial because its members are offended.”371 Justice Gorsuch 
agreed the memorial was constitutional, but went one step further 
in noting that he would dismiss the case for lack of standing 
 
 361 See id. at 2437–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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 366 Id. at 2092–93. 
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 371 Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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without reaching the merits.372 He explained: “This ‘offended 
observer’ theory of standing has no basis in law.”373  
Justice Gorsuch considered the policy implications of the 
plaintiffs’ argument: “If individuals and groups could invoke the 
authority of a federal court to forbid what they dislike for no 
more reason than they dislike it, we would risk exceeding the 
judiciary’s limited constitutional mandate and infringing on 
powers committed to other branches of government.”374 Justice 
Gorsuch went on: “Courts would start to look more like 
legislatures, responding to social pressures rather than 
remedying concrete harms, in the process supplanting the right 
of the people and their elected representatives to govern 
themselves.”375 
Justice Gorsuch also disagreed with the implication in the 
Court’s opinion that the Bladensburg Peace Cross might have 
survived constitutional scrutiny only because it was old.376 He 
explained that what matters when assessing a monument or 
practice “isn’t its age but its compliance with ageless principles. The 
Constitution’s meaning is fixed, not some good-for-this-day-only 
coupon, and a practice consistent with our nation’s traditions is just 
as permissible whether undertaken today or 94 years ago.”377 
Allowing litigation by offended observers, Justice Gorsuch 
argued, courted disaster: “what about the display of the Ten 
Commandments on the frieze in our own courtroom or on the 
doors leading into it? Or the statutes of Moses and the Apostle 
Paul next door in the Library of Congress?”378 It would be better, 
Justice Gorsuch said, simply to deny standing to offended 
observers so that lower court judges “may dispose of cases like 
these on a motion to dismiss rather than enmeshing themselves 
for years in intractable disputes sure to generate more heat than 
light.”379 
Also instructive is Manhattan Community Access 
Corporation v. Halleck,380 a five-to-four decision holding that a 
private company operating a public access channel was not a 
State actor for purposes of federal court regulation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.381 Justice Kavanaugh wrote the 
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majority opinion, which Justice Gorsuch joined. In the opinion’s 
closing section, Justice Kavanaugh discussed the philosophy 
behind the decision, but in a way that put distance between 
himself and that philosophy.382 Justice Kavanaugh noted: “It is 
sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the 
individual.”383  
Justice Kavanaugh went on to apply that principle in 
Halleck, stating: “Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its 
traditional boundaries would expand governmental control while 
restricting individual liberty and private enterprise. We decline 
to do so in this case.”384 Had Justice Gorsuch penned the opinion, 
its language would likely have been less diplomatic and far more 
emphatic. 
V. DISAGREEMENTS IN THE OCTOBER 2019 TERM  
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh continued to 
disagree in significant ways during the Supreme Court’s October 
2019 term (ending in July 2020). Consider the six cases below, in 
which the two Justices took opposite sides and one or both 
penned opinions. 
A. County Of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund385 
The Clean Water Act prohibits the “addition” of any 
pollutant from a “point source” to “navigable waters” without an 
appropriate permit from the Environmental Protection Agency.386 
In County of Maui, the Supreme Court considered whether this 
permitting requirement applied to pollutants that travelled from 
a point source to navigable waters through the medium of ground 
water.387 By a six-to-three vote, the Court rejected the alternative 
answers of always and never, holding instead that a permit was 
required “if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is 
the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point 
source into navigable waters.”388 In an opinion by Justice Breyer, 
the Court went on to hold that in making this determination, 
courts should consider a variety of factors, such as the distance 
between the point source and the navigable waters and the time 
it takes the pollutant to travel that distance.389 
 
 382 Id. at 1934. 
 383 Id. 
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 385 County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). 
 386 Id. at 1468 (referring to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A)). 
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Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion that defended 
the Court’s pragmatic, middle ground approach. He noted that a 
flexible standard was needed to prevent evasion of the statutory 
purpose.390 He further observed that the Court’s opinion 
improved the law: “Although the statutory text does not supply a 
bright-line test, the Court’s emphasis on time and distance will 
help guide application of the statutory standard going 
forward.”391 
Justice Gorsuch joined a dissenting opinion by Justice 
Thomas, which took a formalistic approach. Justice Thomas said 
that he “would hold that a permit is required only when a point 
source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters.”392 
Justice Thomas argued that his approach was true to the 
statutory text (in particular, the words “addition,” “from,” and 
“to”),393 whereas the majority opinion departed from the text in 
favor of “an open-ended inquiry into congressional intent and 
practical considerations.”394 
This case illustrates the jurisprudential divide between the 
two Justices. Justice Kavanaugh prefers pragmatic standards 
that give federal courts and agencies reasonable discretion to 
balance opposing considerations and reach common sense 
solutions to practical problems. By contrast, Justice Gorsuch 
prefers formal rules derived from statutory texts that establish 
clear rights for private parties and restrict the discretion of 
courts and officials. 
B. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian395 
Over the course of almost a century, Anaconda Copper Mining 
Company, a smelting operator in Montana, caused massive 
arsenic and lead pollution over a three hundred square mile 
area.396 To remedy the pollution, a group of homeowners in 
Montana sued Atlantic Richfield (Anaconda’s corporate successor) 
in state court under state law, demanding that the company pay to 
have their land restored to its original, unpolluted condition.397 
Because Atlantic Richfield had been working with the 
Environmental Protection Agency for thirty-five years on efforts to 
clear up pollution in the area pursuant to the federal Superfund 
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statute,398 the company argued that the state courts did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case and that any restoration remedy 
required the approval of the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”).399 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts in which Justice 
Kavanaugh joined, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs 
could proceed with their state court suit but needed approval of 
the EPA for their restoration remedy.400 As a technical matter, 
the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs were “potentially 
responsible parties” within the meaning of the Superfund statute 
and therefore subject to EPA jurisdiction.401 As a practical 
matter, the Court said that EPA supervision of private litigation 
was needed to facilitate settlements with polluters by protecting 
settling parties from third party claims.402 
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the 
holding that the homeowners needed EPA approval. Citing a 
provision of the Superfund law that expressly preserved state law 
remedies, Justice Gorsuch argued that everything in the federal law 
“seeks to supplement, not supplant, traditional state law remedies 
and promote, not prohibit, efforts to restore contaminated land.”403 
After arguing that the statutory language about potentially 
responsible parties did not support the Court’s conclusion,404 Justice 
Gorsuch challenged the policy arguments in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion. Justice Gorsuch said: “Maybe paternalistic central 
planning cannot tolerate parallel state law efforts to restore state 
lands. But maybe, too, good government and environmental 
protection would be better served if state law remedies proceeded 
alongside federal efforts.”405 Having posed the question, Justice 
Gorsuch said that Congress made the policy decision when it chose 
to preserve state law remedies in general, while specifically 
allowing the federal government to seek injunctive relief if private 
or state cleanup efforts really do interfere with federal interests.406 
Justice Gorsuch concluded: “Atlantic Richfield would have us turn 
this system upside down, recasting the statute’s presumption in 
favor of cooperative federalism into a presumption of federal 
absolutism.”407 
 
 398 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. 
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Once again, Justice Kavanaugh is apt to read statutes as 
conferring discretion on federal officials to do what they may 
need to do in order to accomplish their missions. Justice Gorsuch 
sees those same laws as preserving traditional individual rights 
and protecting private citizens from the will of bureaucrats. 
C. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP408 
A federal statute gives the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office authority to consider challenges to previously issued 
patents and, if the agency deems proper, to revoke the challenged 
patents.409 The statute further provides that these proceedings 
may not be instituted more than a year after suit against the 
requesting party for a patent infringement,410 but also provides 
that the agency’s decision to institute a proceeding is “final and 
nonappealable.”411  
In Thryv, Inc., the Patent Office instituted a challenge 
proceeding more than a year after the requesting party was sued 
for infringement and then went on to rule for the challenger.412 
By a seven-to-two vote, the Supreme Court held that Patent 
Office’s decision to institute proceedings in apparent violation of 
the statutory deadline was not subject to judicial review.413 The 
Court reasoned that Congress intended to immunize such agency 
decisions concerning challenge proceedings in order to achieve 
important goals, such as promoting efficiency, avoiding costly 
litigation and making patent revocation decisions effective more 
quickly.414 
Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined only by Justice 
Sotomayor. In the opening paragraph of his dissent, Justice 
Gorsuch made his objections clear: “Today the Court takes a 
flawed premise—that the Constitution permits a politically 
guided agency to revoke an inventor’s property right in an issued 
patent—and bends it further, allowing the agency’s decision to stand 
immune from judicial review.”415 The dissent continued: “Most 
remarkably, the Court denies judicial review even though the 
government now concedes that the patent owner is right and this 
entire exercise in property-taking-by-bureaucracy was forbidden by 
 
 408 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020). 
 409 See 35 U.S.C. § 314. 
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law.”416 Justice Gorsuch argued that the relevant statute did not 
require this result, and therefore the Court should not have taken yet 
“another step down the road of ceding core judicial powers to agency 
officials and leaving the disposition of private rights to bureaucratic 
mercy.”417  
Justice Gorsuch went on to criticize what he perceived to be the 
Court giving unreviewable discretion to the politically-appointed 
head of the Patent Office. “No one can doubt that this regime favors 
those with political clout, the powerful and the popular. . . . Rather 
than securing incentives to invent, the regime creates incentives to 
curry favor with officials in Washington.”418 Justice Gorsuch 
concluded: “Nothing in the statute commands this result, and 
nothing in the Constitution permits it.”419 
The Thryv, Inc. dissent provides a telling glimpse of the 
rationale underlying Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence. He thinks 
courts should prevent lawless federal bureaucrats from imposing 
upon individuals’ rights. Justice Kavanaugh, by contrast, has a 
much more positive view of the federal government and does not 
mind when Congress makes agency decisions unreviewable in 
order to promote efficiency.  
D. Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc.420 
In 1991, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act, which prohibited (absent emergency or prior 
express consent) automated calls to cellphones. In 2015, 
Congress amended the statute to permit automated calls (also 
known as robocalls) to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States.421 In Barr, an opinion written by Justice 
Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court held by a vote of six-to-three 
that the amended law violated the First Amendment because it 
regulated speech on the basis of content.422 The Court went on 
(by a vote of seven-to-two) to correct the constitutional infirmity 
by eliminating the 2015 amendment and restoring the general 
ban on robocalls to cellphones.423 Justice Gorsuch agreed that the 
amended law was unconstitutional, but said the proper remedy 
was to grant the plaintiffs an injunction against the ban’s 
enforcement, rather than to sever the statute.424  
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 420 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020). 
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Barr further demonstrates how the two Justices diverge in 
their attitudes toward precedent. Justice Kavanaugh followed 
prior decisions holding that the Supreme Court should try to 
limit its remedy by striking down only the unconstitutional 
portions of a statute and saving as much of the law as possible.425 
Justice Gorsuch preferred to reason from first principles, taking 
the position that the Court should simply enjoin enforcement of 
an unconstitutional statute, arguing that the Court’s practice of 
severing the unconstitutional portions and preserving the rest 
amounted to impermissible judicial rewriting of the law.426 
Justice Kavanaugh responded to this critique by noting that 
Justice Gorsuch’s approach was a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” that 
“would disrespect the democratic process, through which the 
people’s representatives” expressed their will.427 Justice 
Kavanaugh preferred the approach dictated by the Court’s 
precedents; to try to salvage as much of the statute as possible 
was, he wrote, “constitutional, stable, predictable, and 
commonsensical.”428 
The two Justices valued the competing interests of the 
parties differently. Justice Gorsuch expressed distaste that the 
Court would outlaw private speech—namely, robocalls to 
cellphones to collect debts owed to the government—when 
Congress had expressly made that speech lawful.429 For Justice 
Kavanaugh, protecting people from unwanted robocalls was the 
top priority: “Justice Gorsuch’s remedy would end up 
harming . . . the tens of millions of consumers who would be 
bombarded every day with nonstop robocalls notwithstanding 
Congress’s clear prohibition of those robocalls.”430 Justice 
Gorsuch responded: “Having to tolerate unwanted speech 
imposes no cognizable constitutional injury on anyone; it is life 
under the First Amendment, which is almost always invoked to 
protect speech some would rather not hear.”431 
As evidenced in Barr, Justice Kavanaugh prefers to follow 
precedent and preserve common sense federal regulations that 
protect the community from harm. This case provides yet another 
example of how both Justices differ in opinion. Justice Gorsuch 
prefers to reason from first principles and protect liberty.  
 
 425 See id. at 2350–51. 
 426 See id. at 2365 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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E. McGirt v. Oklahoma432 
In 1997, Jimcy McGirt, an enrolled member of the Seminole 
Nation, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of sexual assaults 
on his wife’s four-year old granddaughter and sentenced to 1,000 
years plus life in prison.433 In post-conviction proceedings, McGirt 
challenged the State’s jurisdiction to prosecute him, and 
therefore his resulting conviction, on the ground that his crime 
took place on a Creek Reservation and, according to the federal 
Major Crimes Act, “[a]ny Indian who commits” certain 
enumerated offenses “within Indian country” may only be 
prosecuted in federal court.434 The key issue in the case was 
whether the land that McGirt claimed to be a Creek 
Reservation—an area that had been promised to the Creek 
Nation by the federal government in the 1830s435 and spanned 
three million acres, including most of the city of Tulsa436—was in 
fact still a Creek Reservation or whether the reservation status 
had been effectively abolished by Congress in a series of statutes 
enacted between 1890 and 1910.437 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of McGirt by a vote of 
five-to-four, the majority consisting of Justice Gorsuch plus the 
Court’s four Democratic appointees.438 Justice Gorsuch wrote 
the opinion for the Court.439 The majority held that, while 
Congress had the power to break the federal government’s 
promise to the Creeks, Congress had never expressly and 
formally done so. Therefore, the land in question remained a 
Creek Reservation, even though the State of Oklahoma had 
been exercising criminal jurisdiction over the area and treating 
the reservation as extinguished for more than one hundred 
years.440 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court began: “On the far 
end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced to leave their 
ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the Creek Nation 
received assurances that their new lands in the West would be 
secure forever.”441 The opinion acknowledged that Congress had 
the power to break that promise, but said the repudiation had to 
be express, not simply inferred from a pattern of encroachment 
 
 432 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). 
 433 Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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on tribal rights: “So it’s no matter how many other promises to a 
tribe the federal government has already broken. If Congress 
wishes to break the promise of a reservation, it must say so.”442 
The opinion went on to review the language of the federal 
statutes regarding the Creeks enacted between 1890 and 1910 
and found that none of them, in so many words, abolished the 
Creek Reservation.443 In these circumstances, Justice Gorsuch 
said, arguments based on contemporaneous understanding of the 
laws were irrelevant: “There is no need to consult extratextual 
sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear. Nor may 
extratextual sources overcome those terms.”444 It was similarly 
irrelevant, Justice Gorsuch wrote, that the State of Oklahoma 
had, in fact, been exercising criminal jurisdiction over the land in 
question for more than a century and that allowing the status 
quo to continue would have practical advantages.445 Allowing 
State practice to overcome the written law, Justice Gorsuch said, 
“would be the rule of the strong, not the rule of law.”446 
Justice Gorsuch reiterated that sentiment at the conclusion 
of the majority opinion: “If Congress wishes to withdraw its 
promises, it must say so. Unlawful acts, performed long enough 
and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.”447 
He stated, “To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most 
brazen and longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding 
wrong and failing those in the right.”448 
Justice Kavanaugh, along with Justice Alito and Justice 
Thomas, joined the dissent by Chief Justice Roberts. That 
opinion began by noting that the majority’s reasoning meant not 
only a rediscovered reservation for the Creeks, but also 
rediscovered reservations for other tribes in Oklahoma.449 The 
dissent observed: “The rediscovered reservations encompass the 
entire eastern half of the State—19 million acres that are home 
to 1.8 million people, only 10%-15% of whom are Indians.”450  
The dissent pointed out the majority opinion would hobble 
the State’s ability to prosecute serious crimes in a vast area, 
possibly invalidate decades of past convictions, and profoundly 
destabilize the governance of eastern Oklahoma.451 The opinion 
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went on to say that none of this disruption was warranted. “What 
has gone unquestioned for a century remains true today: A huge 
portion of Oklahoma is not a Creek Indian reservation. Congress 
disestablished any reservation in a series of statutes leading up 
to Oklahoma statehood at the turn of the 19th century.”452  
Chief Justice Roberts described the relevant Congressional 
action as follows: 
What Congress actually did here was enact a series of statutes 
beginning in 1890 and culminating with Oklahoma statehood that (1) 
established a uniform legal system for Indians and non-Indians alike; 
(2) dismantled the Creek government; (3) extinguished the Creek 
Nation’s title to the lands at issue; and (4) incorporated the Creek 
members into a new political community—the State of Oklahoma. 
These statutes evince Congress’s intent to terminate the reservation 
and create a new State in its place.453 
The dissent accused the majority of taking a “blinkered 
approach” that considered each statute in isolation and 
“nitpick[ed] discrete aspects of Congress’s disestablishment effort 
while ignoring the full picture our precedents require us to 
honor.”454 That approach was inconsistent, Chief Justice Roberts 
said, with the Supreme Court’s numerous reservation 
disestablishment precedents that required the Court to consider, 
along with the statutory texts, “the contemporaneous 
understanding of those Acts and the historical context 
surrounding their passage; and the subsequent understanding of 
the status of the reservation and the pattern of settlement 
there.”455 
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts said, the majority was wrong to 
focus on statutory text alone. “Every single one of our 
disestablishment cases has considered extratextual sources, and in 
doing so, none has required the identification of ambiguity in a 
particular term. That is because . . . we have expressly held that the 
appropriate inquiry does not focus on the statutory text alone.”456 
The Chief Justice went on: “there is no ‘magic words’ requirement 
for disestablishment.”457 He reasoned: “In this area, ‘we are not free 
to say to Congress: “We see what you are driving at, but you have 
not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.”’”458 
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Chief Justice Roberts responded to the majority’s argument 
that supposedly drastic consequences do not justify disregarding 
the law by pointing out that “when those consequences are 
drastic precisely because they depart from how the law has been 
applied for more than a century—a settled understanding that 
our precedents demand we consider—they are reason to think 
the Court may have taken a wrong turn in its analysis.”459 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded: “As the Creek, the State of 
Oklahoma, the United States, and our judicial predecessors have 
long agreed, Congress disestablished any Creek reservation more 
than 100 years ago. Oklahoma therefore had jurisdiction to 
prosecute McGirt.”460 
The McGirt case illustrates how Justice Gorsuch prefers to 
reason from first principles rather than precedent, following his 
reading of a text to its logical conclusion without regard to 
practical consequences, and justifying his formalistic approach as 
required by the rule of law. Justice Kavanaugh’s decision to join 
the dissent demonstrates that Justice Kavanaugh is less swayed 
by statutory texts and more inclined to look to legislative 
purpose, follow precedent, and aim for a common sense, 
minimally-disruptive result. 
F. Bostock v. Clayton County461 
In Bostock, the Supreme Court held by a vote of six-to-three 
that discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender 
status constituted discrimination “because of sex” prohibited by 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.462 The majority opinion by 
Justice Gorsuch stated its rationale in its opening paragraph: “An 
employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or 
transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not 
have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a 
necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what 
Title VII forbids.”463 
To justify this conclusion, Justice Gorsuch eschewed 
precedents, policy analysis, and popular understandings of what 
Title VII meant.464 Instead, he treated the question as a logic 
puzzle.465 His opinion posed the hypothetical of an employer with 
a male employee and a female employee, both of whom were 
 
 459 Id. at 2502. 
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 461 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).  
 462 See id. at 1736–37; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 463 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 464 See id. at 1738–42.  
 465 See id. at 1750–54. 
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attracted to men.466 Suppose the employer were to fire the male 
employee for being attracted to men when the employer would 
not fire the female employee for being attracted to men.467 As a 
matter of common parlance, that would be called discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.468 But, as a matter of formal logic, it 
would also be discrimination against the male employee because 
of his sex, in addition to his sexual orientation, and therefore 
prohibited by Title VII. As Justice Gorsuch explained, in 
answering his hypothetical: “If the employer fires the male 
employee for no reason other than the fact that he is attracted to 
men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions 
it tolerates in his female colleague.”469 
Justice Gorsuch went on to apply this logic to discrimination 
against transgender individuals in a hypothetical involving an 
employer who fired a transgender person who identified as a 
male at birth but who now identified as a female: “If the 
employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was 
identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes 
a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it 
tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.”470 He 
continued, “Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an 
unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge 
decision.”471 
Justice Gorsuch brushed aside the argument that Congress 
was not contemplating discrimination based on sexual orientation 
or transgender status when it enacted Title VII.472 He instead 
placed value upon the meaning of the words that Congress enacted, 
not what they might have been thinking.473 As he put it: “the limits 
of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s 
demands.”474 Justice Gorsuch went on: “When the express terms of 
a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations 
suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, 
and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”475 
Justice Gorsuch expanded on this idea later in his opinion, 
rejecting the argument that given popular attitudes in 1964 
Congress could not have really intended to prohibit 
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discrimination against homosexuals.476 He explained that to 
refuse to enforce the letter of the law for the benefit of a group of 
people who “happened to be unpopular at the time of the law’s 
passage, would not only require us to abandon our role as 
interpreters of statutes; it would tilt the scales of justice in favor 
of the strong or popular and neglect the promise that all persons 
are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”477 
Justice Gorsuch then invoked the tenets of legal formalism 
to justify the Court’s expansive interpretation of Title VII by 
stating, “. . .[O]ur role is limited to applying the law’s demands as 
faithfully as we can in the cases that come before us. . . . And the 
same judicial humility that requires us to refrain from adding to 
statutes requires us to refrain from diminishing them.”478 
Justice Gorsuch explained that courts are bound to follow 
statutory texts whichever way they lead, regardless of what 
Congress may have had in mind, noting: “Ours is a society of 
written laws. Judges are not free to overlook plain statutory 
commands on the strength of nothing more than suppositions 
about intentions or guesswork about expectations.”479 
Justice Alito wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, 
accusing the majority of writing “legislation” in the guise of a 
judicial opinion.480 Justice Alito declared: “A more brazen abuse 
of our authority to interpret statutes is hard to recall.”481 He 
continued: “The Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship. It sails 
under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is . . . the 
theory that courts should ‘update’ old statutes so that they better 
reflect the current values of society.”482 
Justice Alito went on to criticize the majority’s opinion for 
focusing on a literal and logical meaning of the phrase “because of 
sex” rather than considering what the words meant to the drafters 
and their original audience.483 His dissent said: “Textualists do not 
read statutes as if they were messages picked up by a powerful 
radio telescope from a distant and utterly unknown civilization.”484 
Rather: “Statutes consist of communications between members of a 
particular linguistic community, one that existed in a particular 
place and at a particular time, and these communications must 
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therefore be interpreted as they were understood by that 
community at that time.”485 If the Court followed this method of 
construing statutes, Justice Alito concluded, “[t]he answer could not 
be clearer. In 1964, ordinary Americans reading the text of Title VII 
would not have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant 
discrimination because of sexual orientation, much less gender 
identity.”486 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate dissent and saw the 
case as presenting the practical, legal process question of 
whether the Court should extend Title VII’s prohibition against 
sex discrimination to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.487 Starting from the premise that there is a 
difference between discrimination based on sex and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.488 Justice 
Kavanaugh’s dissent began: “Like many cases in this Court, this 
case boils down to one fundamental question: Who decides?”489 
He opined: “The question here is whether Title VII should be 
expanded to prohibit employment discrimination because of 
sexual orientation. Under the Constitution’s separation of 
powers, the responsibility to amend Title VII belongs to Congress 
and the President in the legislative process, not to this Court.”490 
Justice Kavanaugh made it plain that, if the decision were his, 
he would probably vote to amend the law.491 “The policy arguments 
for amending Title VII are very weighty. The Court has previously 
stated, and I fully agree, that gay and lesbian Americans ‘cannot be 
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.’”492 But 
public policy alone, Justice Kavanaugh said, was not sufficient to 
justify a momentous changing of the law by the Court: “Under the 
Constitution’s separation of powers, our role as judges is to 
interpret and follow the law as written, regardless of whether we 
like the result.”493 And interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
based on the common sense meaning of its words, Justice 
Kavanaugh said: “Title VII does not prohibit employment 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”494 
Justice Kavanaugh went on to reject the majority’s logical, 
literalist interpretation of the statute in favor of a common-sense 
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approach.495 According to Justice Kavanaugh, “courts must follow 
ordinary meaning, not literal meaning. And courts must adhere 
to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of the 
words in a phrase.”496 Justice Kavanaugh explained: “Citizens 
and legislators must be able to ascertain the law by reading the 
words of the statute. Both the rule of law and democratic 
accountability badly suffer when a court adopts a hidden or 
obscure interpretation of the law, and not its ordinary 
meaning.”497  
In support of common sense interpretation of statutory 
words, Justice Kavanaugh cited numerous precedents that, he 
said, “exemplify a deeply rooted principle: When there is a divide 
between the literal meaning and the ordinary meaning, courts 
must follow the ordinary meaning.”498 Similarly, Justice 
Kavanaugh noted, the Court’s precedents made it clear that 
courts should follow “the ordinary meaning of a phrase, rather 
than the meaning of words in the phrase.”499 He recalled: “In the 
words of Learned Hand: ‘a sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the 
forest for the trees.’ The full body of a text contains implications 
that can alter the literal meaning of individual words.’”500 In 
other words, Justice Kavanaugh said: “Do not simply split 
statutory phrases into their component words, look up each in a 
dictionary, and then mechanically put them together again, as 
the majority opinion today mistakenly does.”501 Justice 
Kavanaugh concluded: “Statutory interpretation 101 instructs 
courts to follow ordinary meaning, not literal meaning, and to 
adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning 
of the words in a phrase.”502 
Justice Kavanaugh then applied this standard to the issue at 
hand: Does the ordinary meaning of the phrase “‘discriminate 
because of sex’” necessarily “encompass discrimination because of 
sexual orientation? The answer is plainly no.”503 Rather, in 
Justice Kavanaugh’s view: “Both common parlance and common 
legal usage treat sex discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination as two distinct categories of discrimination—back 
in 1964 and still today.”504  
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Justice Kavanaugh observed that many federal statutes 
prohibit sex discrimination per se, while many other statutes 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, implying 
that Congress saw a distinction between the two.505 “To this day, 
Congress has never defined sex discrimination to encompass 
sexual orientation discrimination. Instead, when Congress wants 
to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in addition to sex 
discrimination, Congress explicitly refers to sexual orientation 
discrimination.”506 “In short,” Justice Kavanaugh concluded, “an 
extensive body of federal law both reflects and reinforces the 
widespread understanding that sexual orientation discrimination 
is distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.”507 
At the close of his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh described the 
majority opinion as an act of “judges latching on to a novel form 
of living literalism to rewrite ordinary meaning and remake 
American law.”508 Taking a more conciliatory tone than Justice 
Alito, Justice Kavanaugh went on “to acknowledge the important 
victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans.”509 “They 
have advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in 
today’s result. Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, 
however, I believe that it was Congress’s role, not this Court’s, to 
amend Title VII.”510 
The Bostock case provides yet another telling glimpse of the 
jurisprudential divide between the Justices. Justice Gorsuch 
interprets texts formally and literally, without regard to 
precedents, practical consequences, or what the drafters may 
have intended. He takes pride in following the written law, as he 
understands it, to its logical conclusion. Justice Kavanaugh reads 
statutes in a practical, common sense way. His goal is to give 
legal language the meaning intended by its drafters, understood 
by ordinary audiences, and generally accepted by policymakers. 
He eschews literalism and logical formalism.  
VI. PRAGMATIC INSIDER VERSUS FORMALIST OUTSIDER  
In July 2019, Justice Ginsburg described the Supreme Court as 
“the most collegial place” she ever worked.511 In that same talk, she 
described her “newest colleagues” as “very decent and very smart 
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individuals.”512 Justice Ginsburg had reasons to be pleased. 
Contrary to expectations, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh 
provided Justice Ginsburg with key votes in important cases.  
It is also noteworthy that (in divided cases) the two 
Justices’ support for Justice Ginsburg’s majorities rarely came 
together; it was almost always one or the other.513 That is 
because, despite attending the same high school and clerking 
together for the same Supreme Court Justice,514 Justice 
Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch represent two different brands 
of conservative judicial philosophy.515 What is more, their 
differences run orthogonal to the familiar fault line between 
liberals and conservatives. One Justice is a pragmatic insider, 
while the other is a formalist outsider. 
A. The Pragmatic Insider 
A native of the Washington D.C. area, who returned to the 
locale after college and law school at Yale and a one-year judicial 
clerkship on the West Coast,516 Justice Kavanaugh seems imbued 
with the ideals of his hometown. He sees the U.S. government as 
a force for good with a moral obligation to make the world a 
better place. He has a positive, insider view of the federal 
government and federal power. 
A veteran of the George W. Bush White House who has spent 
his career in federal service,517 Justice Kavanaugh is sensitive to 
the practical needs of the federal government. He tends to resolve 
ambiguities in its favor and in favor of facilitating enforcement of 
federal law. He sympathizes with those who exercise federal 
power as well as those who need its protection. He has much less 
concern for those who are subject to federal power and still less 
for those who violate federal law.  
Justice Kavanaugh is also sensitive to the moral sentiments 
of his hometown. When he can go along with those feelings (such 
as by holding that a Mississippi prosecutor engaged in racial 
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 513 See infra, Part VI.A–B. 
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 515 For an informative discussion of the opposing brands, see Margaret H. Lemos, 
Book Review, The Politics of Statutory Construction, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2013). 
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discrimination),518 he is happy to do so. When he goes against a 
significant number of local opinion leaders (such as by rejecting a 
constitutional challenge to the Bladensburg Peace Cross),519 he 
does so with apologies, expressions of respect for the losing 
plaintiffs, and overtures that he might be open to similar claims 
in the future. While he may reject particular federal 
interventions as unwise, he makes it clear he understands the 
moral imperative of federal oversight to ensure human rights 
and justice. 
Justice Kavanaugh subscribes to the public policy approach 
to jurisprudence that is dominant in Washington D.C. and the 
legal academy.520 He believes judges make law and sees that 
exercise as a pragmatic process for the protection and 
improvement of society. He thinks judges should update the law 
as needed to advance the policies behind modern statutes and 
decisions.521 He believes laws should be construed flexibly based 
on practical needs, within the bounds of ordinary, common sense 
understanding.522 In his opening remarks at his confirmation 
hearing, he told the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[i]n 
deciding cases, a judge must always keep in mind what 
Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist 83: ‘the rules of legal 
interpretation are rules of common sense.’”523  
At the same time, Justice Kavanaugh is a careful, prudential 
conservative. He worries about the practical consequences of his 
decisions far more than he cares about their theoretical 
provenance. He is wary of disrupting the status quo. He likes to 
follow precedent and stay close to consensus. His writing style, 
consistent with these values, is solid, conventional, institutional, 
careful, qualified and matter-of-fact.524 His opinions take the tone 
of reasonable policy decisions rather than logical arguments. 
Justice Kavanaugh is deferential to his colleagues, Congress, 
and the Executive Branch. He takes pains to avoid offending the 
conservative or liberal establishments. While sympathetic to the 
general idea of federal oversight, he is open to arguments that 
 
 518 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). 
 519 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
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SHAPING AMERICAN LAW (2017). 
 521 For academic support of this approach, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & 
Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CAL. L. REV. 699 (2013). 
 522 For academic support, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory 
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (1989).  
 523 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Reshaping American Jurisprudence in the Trump Era – The 
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Kavanaugh, 44 VER. BAR J. 30, 30 (2018). 
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particular expansions of federal power would be impractical, 
unwarranted, unnecessary, or unwise.  
B. Formalist Outsider  
A native of Colorado, whose early experience with the 
nation’s capital was the public shaming of his mother,525 Justice 
Gorsuch has a wary, outsider view of Washington, D.C. Unlike 
those who worry about the federal government’s possible sins of 
omission, Justice Gorsuch’s focus is on the federal government’s 
sins of commission. In particular, he thinks the federal 
bureaucracy should take greater care to stay within the limits of 
its authority and respect the traditions and liberties of others.  
Justice Gorsuch sympathizes with those on the receiving end 
of federal power or otherwise at odds with the federal 
government. He cares about those who need protection from 
federal authorities. He has much less sympathy for those who 
exercise or seek to invoke federal power. The practical 
consequence of this approach is a series of votes that do not seem 
coherent from a liberal or conservative perspective. In the 
October 2018 term, he took the side of armed robbers,526 Apple 
Inc.,527 equipment manufacturers,528 the Tennessee state 
legislature,529 a Mississippi state prosecutor,530 a former 
carpenter seeking federal disability benefits,531 an ex-offender 
convicted of illegal possession of a gun,532 a federal criminal 
defendant convicted of possession of child pornography,533 and 
the Yakama Nation.534 In some ways, Justice Gorsuch may be 
likened to a small-town lawyer whose willingness to challenge 
the establishment attracts an odd collection of clients. 
Justice Gorsuch has an “engaging and readable writing 
style”535 that is much more affable than that of his predecessor, 
Justice Scalia, and much more folksy than Justice Kavanaugh’s 
 
 525 See Heather Elliott, Gorsuch v. The Administrative State, 70 ALA. L. REV. 703, 711 
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institutional tone. Consistent with his anti-establishment 
attitudes, Justice Gorsuch starts sentences with conjunctions, 
writes in the second person, and uses contractions, sentence 
fragments, and alliteration.536 At the same time, consistent with 
his doctorate from Oxford, Justice Gorsuch employs the tropes of 
classical rhetoric, such as syllogism, pathos, hyperbole, and 
rhetorical questions.537 He prioritizes logical reasoning over 
modern policy analysis. 
Justice Gorsuch follows a deontological theory of 
jurisprudence that works well for those who wish to restrain 
federal power538 but has limited support in the legal academy539 
and Washington D.C. A key premise of that theory, in the words 
of a recent article by Gillian E. Metzger, is the “highly formalist” 
“classical image of law as fixed, determinate, and categorically 
distinct from policy.”540 
In his recent book, Justice Gorsuch described the formalist 
theory more colloquially as the precept that judges “should apply 
the Constitution or a congressional statute as it is, not as [they] 
think[ ] it should be.”541 This approach is necessary, Justice 
Gorsuch explains, because “sticking to the law’s terms is the very 
reason we have independent judges: not to favor certain groups 
or guarantee particular outcomes, but to ensure that all persons 
enjoy the benefit of equal treatment under existing law as 
adopted by the people and their representatives.”542 According to 
Justice Gorsuch, judges should not exercise political discretion or 
look for the fair solution; rather: “Judges aren’t supposed to 
compromise principle but reach their decisions through the 
consistent application of logical premises to a natural end.”543 
 
 536 See Johnson, supra note 519. 
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In practice, for Justice Gorsuch, applying the law as it is 
means construing laws using the traditional interpretative tools 
that judges have used for centuries.544 He rejects the pragmatic 
idea that judges should update laws to fit current needs or 
modern sensibilities. This may sound like positivist deference to 
the legislature, but it is actually closer to natural law.545 The 
traditional interpretative tools Justice Gorsuch prescribes 
include a strong presumption that laws embody the basic 
precepts of Western Civilization, the traditional common law and 
the foundational principles of the American Republic. These are 
the originalist ideas he holds most dear. Whenever possible, he 
construes laws in accordance with his idealized vision of these 
norms.546 This means giving a liberal construction to provisions 
of the Bill of Rights that protect liberty (particularly from 
intrusion by the federal government) and a narrow construction 
to statutes that run contrary to the ideals of the founders.  
At the same time, as the Bostock case illustrates, Justice 
Gorsuch regards the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and likely some 
other modern statutes as well) as establishing new first 
principles akin to those recognized by the Bill of Rights. He is 
willing to follow the logic of their texts to expand individual 
rights or promote equality under the law.  
Justice Gorsuch is not a prudential conservative. He does not 
mind defying consensus or convention. He does not worry all that 
much about the practical consequences of his decisions, being 
content to dismiss possible costs as part of the price for liberty 
that the Framers of the Constitution believed to be justified or 
otherwise outside the purview of the judicial role.547 While happy 
to support tradition when it is consistent with his philosophy, 
Justice Gorsuch is also happy to follow his principles to overturn 
precedent, upset the status quo, challenge the establishment, and 
relieve the oppressed. 
 
 544 For a good discussion of originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi & Todd W. Shaw, 
The Jurisprudence of Justice Samuel Alito, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 507, 529 (2019). 
 545 See Richard A. Epstein, Our Implied Constitution, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 295 
(2017).  
 546 Interestingly, the seventeenth century English resistance to royal absolutism 
followed a similar ideological strategy. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical 
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1688 (1994) (“[Sir Edward] Coke 
was not a reactionary but a radical conservative, who reached back into the remote past 
not only to strike down innovations of the preceding century of accumulating royal power 
but also to justify wholly new legal principles.”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 
LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 439 (2003) (describing Coke as “the seventeenth-century 
mythologist of the ‘ancient constitution’”). 
 547 See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The philosophical differences between Justice Kavanaugh 
and Justice Gorsuch have made their collective impact on the 
Supreme Court less conservative, less partisan, less predictable, 
and more representative of the country than most people 
expected when Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court in 2018. 
While this turn of events may disappoint some, on balance it is 
good news for the Supreme Court as an institution—and good 
news for the nation. 
 
